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The Shape of Things

THE BATTLE FOR SINGAPORE HAS REACHED

a crucial stage with the landing of Japanese troops on Singapore Island proper. Although the British claim to have driven back the first of the invaders, it is obvious that more landings will follow. It is now a race against time. The Japanese are trying to overwhelm the defenders before the substantial reinforcements known to be on the way can arrive. But although they have rendered the huge naval base useless, a tenacious defense may still rob them, as in the Philippines, of final conquest. In Burma the situation has improved. The Japanese have made little or no progress toward Rangoon in the past week, and the entry of veteran Chinese troops into the front lines would seem an effective guaranty against further Japanese progress in the sector they control. Burma remains the one battle zone in which the United Nations have been able to achieve supremacy in the air. Elsewhere in the Pacific the picture remains clouded. General MacArthur still holds part of the Bataan Peninsula, but it is evident that he is being forced steadily back. And with the acknowledged loss of Amboina Island and Samarinda, the Dutch position has become increasingly serious.

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THE SHIPPING RESOURCES OF THE UNITED

Nations are still very large, but they are being strained to the uttermost by the demands of the Battle of the Pacific, the huge import needs of American war industries, and the constant call for supplies for Russia and Britain. Thus every U-boat torpedo which finds a mark deals a heavy blow, and we must recognize that Hitler has scored a success by sending his submarines to operate on this side of the Atlantic. How dearly that success is costing him we do not know, since the navy, as a general rule, does not mention successful attacks on enemy submarines. We must be content with Mr. Knox's assurance that the raiders are not getting off scot-free, and the curve of ship sinkings will soon reveal whether the German navy is able to stand the pace. British sources report that ship losses in the Atlantic as a whole in January were above the average for the last six months but below the figure for January, 1941. Off the shores of the United States fifteen vessels have been attacked and fourteen sunk. The

fact that many of these ships were tankers again raises the possibility of gasoline and fuel-oil rationing along the Eastern seaboard. Should that prove necessary, we hope there will be better organization than was in evidence last summer. The most tragic side of the U-boat campaign is the loss of 400 seamen. We wonder about the efficacy of the life-saving equipment with which they were provided. The Norwegian mercantile marine has adopted a special life-saving suit which keeps men not only afloat but warm and dry. The Maritime Commission and the seamen's unions would do well to investigate this invention.

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BY NAMING LORD BEAVERBROOK MINISTER of War Production Mr. Churchill has done something to meet the critics of Britain's industrial effort, but the accompanying reshuffle of minor ministers does little to increase confidence in the strength and ability of the government as a whole. The old gang of appeasers cling limpet-like to their posts, and the inner War Cabinet remains untouched, still representing party leaders rather than the best available brains. Moreover, most of its members are burdened with departmental duties and are not free to concentrate on broad questions of policy. The appointment of Lord Beaverbrook to a position analogous to that occupied by Donald Nelson may cut the red tape and curb the atavistic business practices that now keep British production below its potential maximum. But it remains to be seen whether Beaverbrook's notorious lack of tact may not cancel the beneficial effects of his equally notorious energy. When the Ministry of Supply was instituted early in the war, it was supposed to do the job now handed to the Ministry of War Production. But it ended by looking after army needs alone, for the Admiralty continued to insist on bossing naval production, while lack of cooperation from the Air Ministry led to the creation of a separate Ministry of Aircraft Production. Sir Stafford Cripps is reported to have been offered the Ministry of Supply but to have refused because it did not carry membership in the War Cabinet. Returning to the House of Commons "with an open mind," he will occupy a strategic position in the event of a future ministerial crisis as the one man of front-rank reputation now outside the government.

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WE HOPE SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS'S APPEAL FOR a closer and more cordial association between Russia and the Western democracies will not go unheeded. Since Hitler struck at the Soviets last year there has been a gradual improvement in relations, but they still rest on a basis of immediate expediency. There remain influential people in Britain and America who are more worried by the prospect of a Russian victory over Germany than of a German victory over Russia. There are others who fondly hope that the future will be made safe for respectable reaction by a mutual throat-cutting on the part of Hitler

and Stalin. Such political psychopaths, as Cripps has pointed out, offer the perfect medium for the culture of Goebbels's deadly bacteria. Admittedly, the Kremlin's frequent resort to Machiavellian tactics did much to assist the Nazis in building up the "red menace." But we can now see that Russia for nearly ten years has been pre-occupied by preparations to meet a Nazi onslaught which it realized was inevitable once Hitler had been allowed to establish his regime. When the danger of German imperialism to Russia has been permanently removed, there is some reason to expect a reorientation of Soviet policies. Sir Stafford Cripps, who as Britain's ambassador in Moscow until recently had excellent opportunities for exploring the minds of the Soviet leaders, declares that Russia is "anxious and most willing to work in association with Great Britain and America after the war and to prepare now so as to make that work as effective and valuable as possible." He points out that the three countries have all signed the Atlantic Charter. If they could get together in an effort to translate that rather vague document into concrete terms, they might discover that their post-war aims are not as incompatible as is feared and so do much to banish the suspicions now hindering the growth of mutual confidence.

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BRITISH ANXIETY OVER EGYPT SEEMS TO have been at least temporarily allayed by the formation of a new National Union government headed by Mustapha Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafd, the largest of Egypt's political parties. Although the previous government resigned ostensibly because of the ill health of Premier Hussein Sirry Pasha, it is known that Axis, particularly Italian, agents had been at work stirring up discontent. The Wafd Party has hitherto refused to participate in the government on the ground that the elections to the present Egyptian Chamber were unfair. Its acceptance of power now is generally regarded as a rebuff to Axis agents, who had sought to provoke serious political disturbances. Axis prospects were also dealt a heavy blow recently when the Egyptian government broke off diplomatic relations with Vichy, thus eliminating the source of much pro-Axis propaganda. Although the new Premier is expected to continue his predecessor's policy with regard to the war, the British have definite misgivings about King Farouk. And it remains to be seen how staunch the new government's loyalty will be in the event of an invasion of Egypt by General Rommel's powerfully augmented forces.

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LITTLE BETTER USE OF THE PRODUCTIVE resources of small business enterprises throughout the country has so far been made by the War Production Board than by its predecessors, the SPAB and OPM. According to the report of the Senate's Small Business

Committee, 56 of the country's 184,230 manufacturing plants have received more than 75 per cent of army and navy contracts. Only 6,000 plants—or one out of thirty—have received defense orders of any kind. Responsibility for this situation is placed squarely on Donald Nelson by the Senate committee. The report points out that Mr. Nelson not only is a representative of big business himself but has chosen big-business executives to head the four most important divisions of his organization. Furthermore, practically nothing was done to spread contracts to small business men during the months when Mr. Nelson was director of the Office of Small Business Affairs under the National Defense Advisory Commission. That the enlistment of small business in the war effort can be achieved where there is a will to do it is indicated in a survey of the Philadelphia Ordnance District recently printed in the *New York Times*. In this area, largely through the efforts of the chief ordnance officer, 598 prime contracts and some 7,500 subcontracts have been let. One large tank manufacturer uses 211 subcontractors, who in turn are assisted by 1,056 sub-subcontractors. Among these is an automobile service garage which uses its lathe to turn out a small rod that props open a door of a piston porthole in a tank. The results of this subcontracting have been excellent, and there is no legitimate reason why the same methods should not be used throughout the country.

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THE BUSINESS DOMINATION OF THE WAR effort came in for further stringent criticism when R. J. Thomas, president of the United Automobile Workers, placed the blame for the delay in shifting to all-out war production primarily upon the shoulders of Knudsen, who he declared has represented the automobile industry and not the people of the country in his service at Washington. He predicted that the WPB, like the OPM, would fail unless it was reorganized to give labor a bigger voice in the conduct of the arms program. Some business spokesmen complain that Thomas's statement and the U. A. W.'s demand for higher wages violate the spirit of the war-time truce accepted by labor after Pearl Harbor. This is, of course, a smoke screen deliberately set up for the purpose of covering up the ways in which a business-controlled OPM has obstructed all-out production. For if there is any justification for placing representatives of big business in strategic posts on the War Production Board, there is at least equal reason for giving adequate representation to labor.

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ELEANOR ROOSEVELT SHOULD HAVE KNOWN better. She should, in other words, have known that the appointment to defense posts of a movie actor and a dancer who also happened to be her friends would arouse as much fury in the House of Representatives as the dis-

aster at Pearl Harbor. Instead, she provided a perfect opening for attack—though as usual the violence of the storm was hardly justified. If there were any use discussing the merits of the case we could point out that public entertainment may be a vital factor in the morale of citizens and that Melvyn Douglas might be as useful as some of the dollar-a-year men from big business—whom Congressmen never, never object to. We could also point out that the strain of air raids on children is a proper study for a civilian-defense organization and that dancers are also human beings and not automatically disqualified for such work—some Congressmen can't even dance. But we may be sure that the enraged legislators will not let such considerations prevent them from seizing a golden opportunity to attack the Administration and Mrs. Roosevelt. They have inserted a clause in the appropriations bill for the OCD forbidding the use of funds for "instructions in physical fitness by dancers, fan dancing, street shows, theatrical performances, or other public entertainment." What we need now is a clause prohibiting Congressmen from making spectacles of themselves at the taxpayers' expense.

We Can Lose This War

A GOOD many of our daily newspapers seem to have instructed their headline-writers to use the right end of the telescope when viewing successes for our side but to reverse it when looking at Axis achievements. That is one reason why the general public lacks full appreciation of the extremely serious position in which the United Nations are at present placed. The remedy is not lectures on the folly of complacency; it is less distorted news, more facts, and above all more authoritative explanations of what the facts which can be published mean.

In this connection we should like to support the recent plea of Walter Lippmann that greater efforts be made to help the American people "to exercise their inalienable right to understand the war." As Mr. Lippmann says, it is only the President and his chief colleagues who can tell the story, the good with the bad, and explain it; "the people can take it and they will like it, and there will be laid down in this way, as in no other way, the foundations of confidence."

We hope the President will take up this task in his promised broadcast this month. The need is urgent, for there is every sign that a testing time for our nerves is rapidly approaching. Everywhere except in Russia the United Nations are on the defensive. In the Far East, after two months of war, we really have our backs to the wall. Malaya, Borneo, and the Philippines have been lost, even though General MacArthur's little army is still doing yeoman service by immobilizing a considerable Japanese force. Singapore is closely besieged, and Ran-

goon and Java are seriously threatened. If these key positions are lost—and there is no use disguising the fact that they are in grave danger—the opportunity for a counter-offensive against the Japanese will be long postponed. China with its huge resources of man-power would be cut off from the supplies with which a powerful offensive against the Japanese flank could be developed. Australia and India would both be exposed to attack, and the Indian Ocean would come under Japanese control.

In North Africa the situation is less serious because no absolutely vital point is yet endangered. But what has been lost is the initiative, the early prospect of clearing the Axis out of North Africa and launching an offensive against Italy itself. Nor can the British afford to treat General Rommel's advance lightly. The strategic importance of Egypt as a link between East and West has been enhanced by Japan's entry into the war, and it must be defended at all costs. It is hardly likely that the British will be able to divert more forces from the Middle to the Far East, and it may be necessary to strengthen the army under General Auchinleck. If reinforcements of men and equipment have to be hurried to both the eastern Mediterranean and western Pacific areas the prospects of a new front in Europe this year will grow dim.

Russia, as we have said, remains a bright spot, but we need to guard against the danger of making too heavy a psychological investment in Russian successes. The Red Army has made a magnificent recovery after its long retreat and has made significant advances in its present counter-offensive. But as Sir Stafford Cripps has just warned, the Nazis have not been routed. They have suffered heavy losses of men and equipment; they have been driven out of a number of valuable positions; but they still hold a line from which a spring offensive could be launched when weather conditions again favor the use of mechanized armies. About six weeks of real winter remain; then will come a period of thaw and mud likely to hamper the Russians almost as much as the Germans. Everything, then, depends on whether the Soviet forces can press home their offensive sufficiently to push the Germans out of the eastern Ukraine and out of such strategic centers as Vitebsk, Smolensk, Bryansk, and Kharkov. That would mean a major Nazi defeat and would probably force Hitler to throw into the battle the reserves he is training for the spring campaign.

Reports from a number of European centers suggest that German preparations for that campaign have been on an impressive scale. Factories are turning out masses of tanks and planes for the use of reorganized *Panzer* and *Luftwaffe* units. Not only is Germany itself being combed for men, but tremendous pressure is being put on the puppet allies to supply huge numbers either for service in Russia or to replace Nazi troops in conquered territories. Some of the German dispositions suggest that a dual offensive may be planned—a grandiose pincer

movement with its southern arm striking through Turkey and its northern arm through the Caucasus. The objectives would be oil and the breaking of British imperial communications in the Middle East so as to permit the forging of a link with Japan by way of the Indian Ocean. If this is Hitler's program, Rommel's drive in North Africa may be regarded as a preliminary phase. Another revealing fact is the particularly stubborn defense which the German army has conducted in the Donetz Basin area since the loss of Rostov.

All these plans could be frustrated by a major Russian triumph in the next few weeks, but it is still uncertain whether the Red Army can achieve the essential follow-through. Thus it is particularly disturbing to learn that shipments from this country of vitally needed equipment for Russia have been lagging behind schedule. The main difficulty is said to be shipping. Somehow this obstacle must be removed, for it is Russia that is holding down the largest and most efficient of the Axis armies and thus giving us some freedom of action in the Far East. Should the Russian dyke give way, our situation, already unhappy enough, would indeed become desperate. It is acknowledged that the Russian requests for equipment which we have promised to meet are not exorbitant. Let us break our backs rather than our word.

The first step toward winning this war is a realization that we have a good chance of losing it if, as William L. Batt said last week, we fail to bring to the task anything less than "the constant, driving, unflagging will to win." And that will must be fortified by the kind of intelligent understanding that grasps the connection between sending arms to Russia and beating off the Japanese menace in Asia. None of the many duties of the President is more urgent than the promotion of such understanding.

The Rake's Progress

ON DECEMBER 8, the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Hearst chain of newspapers, which stretches from New York to California, printed prominently the following declaration of editorial policy:

Our main concern now is about England. This attack by Japan upon us is largely to create diversion. We must not be diverted any more than is necessary for our own protection. The war is our war now—not only in Asia but in Europe.

On January 2, however, the same newspapers printed with similar prominence these words:

Mr. Churchill's address was most eloquent, and it may truthfully be said in praise of democracies that they do unerringly select their best talkers for the conduct of their wars. However, it might interest Mr. Churchill to know that the average American . . . does

not think it makes a lot of difference in the eventual issue of this war who owns the sand dunes of the Libyan desert. . . . Is it not about time that the United States thought less of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean and more of the Pacific Ocean . . . and even more about the United States of America?

And on January 28 they followed with this:

England has systematically sacrificed her Allies to her own safety and her own immediate objectives. She sacrificed Norway—withdrew from the battle front without informing the Norwegian forces, with which she was in physical contact, what she was doing and why. She sacrificed Belgium in identically the same manner. . . . England abandoned France at Dunkirk and executed a masterly retreat to England. The French term it as "masterly" desertion of the Allied cause. . . . England's plain policy seems to be to have allies, but not to be an ally. A nation can render any aid or service to England it pleases, but it must not expect any aid and service in return.

Articles of similar purport, with many letters to the editor emphasizing the same points, are continually appearing in the *New York Daily News*, the *Washington Times-Herald*, and other papers. The *Washington Times-Herald* recently referred to the string of Atlantic bases acquired in the destroyer deal as "a lot of time bombs which will one day blow up in our faces," because they were only leased (for ninety-nine years) and not permanently annexed. And all the same points are daily emphasized by the German radio in its efforts to prevent support of the Allied cause by the people of France, Norway, Belgium, and Holland, and to sow distrust in the minds of the people of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and all the colonial territories. Similar expressions of American opinion are quoted in the German broadcasts to Britain in order to foster anti-American feeling in that country.

The Nation has always assumed the sincerity of the great body of isolationists—"the blinder the prejudice the more passionate the conviction." And because of their sincerity, and because their opinions were often backed by firmly intrenched interests, it was obvious that as soon as the honeymoon of "national unity" which began with the Pearl Harbor attack was over, they would once more play a vital part in the public's attitude to the war. They represent forces which might quite conceivably undermine that unity among twenty-six nations through which alone victory can be won. It is axiomatic that if Hitler can cause divisions among this country, the British Empire, Russia, and China, he may beat them. The bitter experience of other countries proves to us that this problem cannot be complacently ignored, especially since this first year of war happens to be a Congressional election year, when politics will inevitably play a heavy part in Congressional action.

Just as isolationism affected foreign policy before the war, so it affects public judgment of the appropriate strategy in war itself—as the isolationist section of the press is now proving.

We know now by the experience of other countries—which also believed that their national unity, in war time at least, would stand up against all assaults—that the enemy strategy counts enormously upon the divisive and disruptive elements in popular feeling: upon nationalist hostilities, racial prejudices, historical animosities, economic rivalries. Such ferments, working actively enough in France before the war to destroy the alliance with Russia, continued after the declaration of war to such degree as to undermine the ties with Britain and prepare the way for a separate peace. They did this by creating first of all that "Maginot mind" which goes with a nationalism that has become hostile to cooperation with foreigners and is compelled therefore to fall back upon purely "defensive" strategy.

But there are two points in France's tragic story which should concern us now. The first is that the divisive forces by which Hitler profited did not come to full fruition until *after* war had begun. While anti-Semitism, anti-Sovietism, Anglophobia did exist before the war, they were regarded as relatively harmless. Plenty of persons in France were ready enough to pass on the slogan, "Britain will fight to the last Frenchman" (the German radio now sends out daily the slogan, "Britain will fight to the last American"), but had you suggested to one of those Frenchmen that he was preparing the way for a government of surrender that would one day allow France to be used for the German conquest of Britain, he would have been not merely completely incredulous but profoundly shocked.

The second point we should recall is that the decision to carry on the war from Africa with a government in Algeria supported by the French navy was defeated only by a margin of three votes in the French Cabinet. A slightly better morale among the leaders, a little less defeatism and Anglophobia, and today the whole of Africa would be unquestionably an Allied bastion, an Anglo-French fleet would command the Mediterranean, Dakar would be an American outpost, Indo-China would never have been handed over to Japan by a Vichy government, immense forces would have been liberated for dealing with Japan, and the lives of tens of thousands of Americans who must die this year or next would have been saved.

The military authorities tell us that wars are won by a final margin of military power which may perhaps be quite small. It is clear that that is true of morale as well. Let us face the facts of American isolationism. In these last few years there has probably been more dislike and fear of Russia in this country than there was in France. The fear of communism has been more hysterical. Dis-

trust of "Europe"—which usually means Britain—goes deeper here than Anglophobia went in France. How could it be otherwise? For years the view has been hammered into the minds of Americans that this country was swindled into participation in the last war; that our participation was achieved mainly by the cunning, lying propaganda of the British and of cynical financial interests; that the character of the peace proved America's costly intervention to have been completely futile. Add to this an aversion to war which found support about equally in materialist cynicism and Christian idealism, and you get some idea of the strength of the feelings to which the American isolationist—and the German propagandist—could appeal.

And to those feelings both are still appealing with undiminished vigor. For the American isolationist the honeymoon of national unity, which is supposed to have begun at four o'clock on the Sunday afternoon of December 7 at Pearl Harbor, is over.

The average American liberal will accept that statement with considerable skepticism. This is partly because it is not his habit to read the isolationist press, which consists mainly of newspapers owned by William Randolph Hearst, Joseph M. Patterson, and Robert R. McCormick, whose publishing enterprises stretch across the entire continent. Their papers have a combined circulation larger than that of any other newspaper group in the United States, and they are able to present to tens of millions of readers the same idea, voice the same prejudice, make the same attack, at the same moment from one end of the country to the other. Do we really assume that such an instrument, used in such a way and appealing to forces like those just described, in a Congressional election year, has no bearing at all on the war effort?

Sea Story

BY FRED KIRCHWEY

A CARGO ship set sail from New York the other day. I saw her go. She pulled out of her slip on West Street and moved down the river, loaded almost to the gunwales. I had watched her load, day by day, as I drove down the highway. Barges and lighters had lain alongside for more than a week while all sorts of crates and sacks were lowered into her hold.

You couldn't help noticing her. She didn't wear the dirty gray coat that covers all the Allied boats docked along West Street. She was trim in black and white; her name was on her bow and a flag was painted on her side. And she steamed out into the North River with the nonchalance of a cruise ship in peace time.

Don't worry—I'm not telling anything that Secretary Knox will object to. Not one word of this information would be useful to the enemy even if I published the

ship's name and the date she sailed. You see the enemy knows about her already; in fact, the enemy approved her departure, and his submarines operating off our coast let her pass unmolested. Dressed in her civilian garb, she moved through them unafraid. For she is a Vichy ship carrying a cargo to Casablanca or some other Vichy port with the permission of the American State Department and of the German Armistice Commission.

American ships and British and Norwegian ships and Free French ships and the ships of many other fighting nations are crawling out of American harbors in the dark, crossing the ocean in huddled convoys, hiding their identity as best they can under smoke-colored paint or camouflage. Many never reach port but carry their crews and cargoes to a cold death in the winter sea. Some come bravely through the infested waters to deliver loads of food and guns on all the fronts where men are fighting against an even more horrifying fate.

But my fine neutral merchantman faces no risks. Don't worry about her. The Nazis have agreed that she shall deliver her cargo safely into the hands of the Vichy authorities in Africa. It is a happy arrangement all round; only a boor would be so crude as to ask Mr. Hull or Mr. Welles why the Nazis have agreed so kindly, so magnanimously. And only a boor would suggest that the reports of supplies of all sorts being delivered in Vichy ships to the Nazi forces in North Africa have any relation whatever to the ship that left New York harbor the other day. Since Vichy has promised that American goods will be kept out of the hands of the Nazis, any doubts would obviously be unworthy. And even if those goods should take the place of other goods which are delivered into the hands of the Nazis, that would be one of those coincidental happenings into which gentlemen and diplomats prefer not to look too closely.

It is true that the British government has presented to Under Secretary Welles detailed evidence that French ships have carried French war supplies from French North Africa to Field Marshal Rommel, and that Vichy is negotiating with the Japanese to turn over French naval units in Indo-China for use against the United Nations in the attack on the Dutch Indies, and apparently Mr. Welles is worried. But whether he is worried enough to consider an immediate break with his neutral friend at Vichy remains to be seen.

Meanwhile it is to be assumed that the Nazis have no motive beyond general benevolence in permitting cargo ships to sail in safety from New York to French North African ports. Any other assumption would reflect on the good faith of a so-called government whose role in this struggle may not become clear to the gentlemen in the State Department until the day that American troops in the Far East are bombarded with shells from Vichy ships manned by Japanese sailors.

Cool Heads or Martial Law

BY ROBERT BENDINER

Washington, February 7

IF THE nerves of the Western Congressional bloc can be soothed, if inflammatory commentators on the "enemy-alien menace" can be diverted to more harmless pursuits, and if the press now working on Martin Dies's "Yellow Book" happily breaks down, we may yet be spared a disaster on the West Coast. With both the Department of Justice and the army threading their way through a veritable minefield, the last thing that is needed is dogmatic advice—from any quarter. What might be helpful, however, is a wider understanding that dangers can come from more than one direction and that there is no simple solution to the problem posed by the presence of some 112,000 Japanese and Japanese-Americans in the three Pacific Coast states.

The first inclination of the military, not unreasonably, is to "Remember Pearl Harbor." While sabotage actually had little to do with that débâcle, Secretary Knox to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no doubt that unrestrained espionage paved the way. Neither is there any doubt that Japanese agents have been doing a similarly systematic job on the West Coast. Upward of 2,000 alleged agents of the Tokyo government have already been arrested, including in their ranks members of the armed services of Japan and of secret military societies. More than one humble fisherman has turned out to be an officer of the imperial navy, and it is highly probable that the coast has been carefully charted all the way from Seattle to San Diego. Propagandists too have long been at work, greatly aided by the 248 Japanese-language schools that flourish on the Coast. Although not more than a third of the country's Japanese racial population is alien born, roughly half of the *Nisei*, or American-born Japanese, have, either under threat or by conviction, registered with Japanese consuls as "dual citizens." Some 15,000 of them have in fact been educated in Japan and have returned to this country, most out of preference but some, no doubt, in line of duty.

Given these facts and figures, the most phlegmatic will admit the probability that in the event of an attack on the Coast, whether by sea or air, a certain amount of aid and comfort would await the enemy. In the circumstances the army mind moves inevitably toward a radical solution: clear all "enemy aliens" out of the coastal region and take no chances.

Here the enormous complexities of the problem begin to crop up, and they are by no means restricted to the field of civil liberties. In the first place, those who would

be affected by such a move are limited to Japanese who came to this country before the Exclusion Act of 1924 and whose average age, I am told, is something like sixty-three; some 20,000 Germans, many of whom are anti-Nazi refugees; and 50,000 Italians, whom almost nobody regards as enemies, much less as a menace. Clearly, then, if a sweeping approach is in order and is to make sense, it would have to take into account the native-born generation as well as the alien. And that is precisely what is being demanded in many quarters of the Far West, with heated Congressional echoes in Washington.

If General De Witt, in command of the Ninth Corps Area, should insist on such a measure as a military necessity, it will be hard for the Department of Justice, which is technically charged with the enemy-alien problem, to refuse. But in that case Attorney General Biddle is prepared to step out of the picture entirely and turn full jurisdiction over to the army. He would almost have to do this, in fact, since the forced migration that would result could never be handled by a handful of lawyers in Washington and a corps of FBI men. Such a solution, moreover, involving suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and a score of other fundamental civil rights, would come with better grace from the military than from the Department of Justice.

There is no jurisdictional squabble over this hot potato. On the contrary, Justice officials do not conceal their distress over the difficulties involved. Nevertheless, the Attorney General is not ready to surrender the problem to the mercies of martial law; first, because he is not convinced of the necessity and, secondly, because he is fully convinced of the extensive evils in such a solution.

The worst of these evils, from the standpoint of national defense, is economic rather than legalistic. Aside from those in domestic service and a handful of business and professional men, a great proportion of the Japanese on the Coast are either fishermen (as are many of the Italians) or truck gardeners. From 30 to 40 per cent of California's truck gardening is in Japanese hands, and in some parts of the state the raising of green vegetables is virtually a Japanese monopoly, with stores and markets wholly dependent on their production. Important at any time, the yield of the Japanese truck farms is vital with the sudden quartering of something like half a million troops in California. Nor is it feasible to supplant these Japanese farmers in a hurry. Trained in a tradition of intensive cultivation, they have learned to make their few acres yield down to the last square foot. As a rule,

moreover, an entire family works a farm, so that even on a strictly numerical basis it would take more than one Okie to replace a Japanese farmer. Complicating matters still further is the fact that for the most part these garden plots are naturally located near the centers of population, in the vicinity of which most of the newly built defense plants are to be found.

Almost as serious a problem as what to do about the farms is the question of what to do with the evicted farmers. No arrangements whatever have been made, and as far as I can gather, nobody yet knows exactly what is to be done, if anything, with those who are scheduled to be expelled from their homes and farms in the prohibited areas already prescribed, though the matter of resettling them is being studied by the Federal Security Administration. There has been some informal toying with the idea of setting up voluntary camps, but it seems all too probable that vigilante pressure would soon remove the optional aspect of this solution, and while it is true that many loyal aliens would be a lot safer in a camp than on the streets of a bombed San Francisco, "protective custody" has too ugly a ring to be readily adopted.

For the time being the Attorney General's office is satisfied to tack and haul, with three main objectives in view. It is cooperating closely with the army in clearing aliens of the enemy countries from limited areas of military importance; it is vigorously tightening the net about enemy agents through curfew regulations in large areas and through the institution of alien certificates throughout the country; and finally it is endeavoring, with increasing success, to convince worried Congressmen and the country itself of the dangers of hysteria and ill-considered administrative extremes. How long it will be able to pursue this restrained and probably nerve-racking course will depend in part on the country's capacity to keep its head. If the first regional exodus, scheduled for February 24, goes through in good order and the jittery are convinced that they can be protected without wholesale expulsions, we shall probably be over the worst hump. If there is a military "incident" on the Coast before then, or some sudden and spectacular act of sabotage, it will be almost impossible to avoid an explosion that will blow away the last shreds of moderation and good sense.

The Plight of the Nisei

BY HOWARD COSTIGAN

EARLY in the evening of the first blackout at Portland, Oregon, the Smith family were belatedly tacking blankets across the dining-room windows and wishing they had eaten dinner earlier. There was a knock at the door and a shouted command to "Open up!" When a Japanese soldier stepped in his front door, Mr. Smith didn't look twice or wait for any explanations. He knew what had happened. As he bolted through the dining-room and out the back way he shrieked a warning to his family: "The invasion is here!" The fact that the soldier was an American and that he wore a United States army uniform wasn't nearly as apparent at first glance as the fact that racially he was Japanese.

Here, essentially, is the problem of the West Coast Japanese. His physical characteristics make his position at present almost unbearable. No matter what he does he is regarded with suspicion. A young Japanese student riding on a bus in a Los Angeles suburb was so upset by the rest of the passengers staring at him that he burst into tears. Suspicion of all Japanese, including Japanese-Americans, has reached a danger-point on the West Coast. Mayor Fletcher Bowron of Los Angeles—elected as a liberal on a fusion ticket—recently fired thirty-nine American-born Japanese on the ground that it was impossible to prove that they had not registered at the

Japanese consulate as "dual citizens." Congressional mail, man-on-the-street interviews, and letters to the editor indicate a crescendo of alarm which threatens to evolve into something ominous. "If there's an air raid here, a lot of those Japs are going to get killed. Throw them in a concentration camp and work it out after the war is over!"

Almost since the first Japanese emigrated to our Pacific Coast there has been bitterness against them. Proverbially thrifty, they soon displayed an irksome tendency to save their money and establish businesses of their own rather than work for other people. The suggestion, a few weeks ago, that they be removed from pension and relief rolls aroused little interest because so very few cases were involved. In the city of Portland, Oregon, for example, with a Japanese colony of only 1,680, the local Chamber of Commerce lists "330 professional men and women and business firms of Japanese ownership." More than a hundred hotels and apartment houses there were Japanese-owned. Employees of the Northern Pacific Railway at Seattle and Auburn, both with large Japanese populations, have had to work for fairly low wages because of the competition of Japanese contract laborers. Now they have delivered an ultimatum that "either the Japs go or we will." The defense value of the railroad, they explain,

is such that it cannot be jeopardized by allowing potential saboteurs to work on it.

The *Nisei*, American-born Japanese, have been quick to volunteer their services for America's defense, but Japanese-Americans in the army have been moved away from coast camps and Japanese-Americans doing civilian defense work are barred from air-raid service. For, as one local observer put it, "what householder could look with equanimity at a Japanese face at the door when the sirens are screaming for an air raid?" The Japanese-American Citizens League, organized in 1930, is rallying its 10,000 members to activity in civilian defense work. A third of the Japanese community in Seattle attended a meeting sponsored by the league and earnestly pledged themselves to do everything possible, from volunteering in the army to buying defense bonds, to aid a "victorious prosecution of the war." But a population which regards Japanese sea and air raids on its coast as imminent isn't soothed by pledges. The morning papers on December 9 carried statements of loyalty by three prominent Japanese. That evening two of them were arrested as alleged subversive agents.

Stories which began to leak out concerning fifth-column activity in Hawaii, some accurate and others completely unfounded, were such as to alarm even those who had kept their heads before. Some of the Japanese pilots shot down at Pearl Harbor were said to be wearing Honolulu High School and Oregon State College rings. Extremely detailed spy information was indicated by the fact that empty hangars were ignored, those with planes bombed. Officers' quarters near the field and roads leading to it were machine-gunned to prevent pilots from reaching their planes. Other roads were effectively blocked by trucks driven across them from side to side. Japanese agents were able to judge from reports on the supplies ordered by the navy from various local vegetable dealers just when the major part of the fleet would be at Pearl Harbor. Unlicensed short-wave stations were found to have been operated by Japanese residents during the raid. Directing arrows were discovered cut in the sugar cane.

As soon as war broke out, FBI agents on the Coast started arresting those suspected of subversive activity or regarded as potentially dangerous. All financial transactions with enemy aliens were immediately banned. (Licenses have now been worked out under which those Japanese who have not left the country since June 17, 1940, can continue to do business as usual with only periodic reports to the Federal Reserve Bank. Others are allowed by their banks amounts under \$500 a month for living expenses.) All cameras and short-wave radios had to be surrendered to the police. No traveling was allowed without police permission. Identification cards had to be carried by all enemy aliens.

These measures meant real hardship. Tenants were

told to withhold rents due Japanese landlords. Employers discharged persons they were not allowed to pay. Blue food stamps indorsed by a Japanese were not honored at local banks. Seattle, mostly dependent on Japanese truck gardeners, found itself with only 10 per cent of its normal supply of fresh vegetables, and when Italy joined the war a few days later, most of that tithe disappeared. Housewives laid in huge supplies of canned vegetables, leaving those stores which weren't boycotted with almost empty shelves. In Seattle, which ranks first in amount of coast-defense expenditures, there has been a 60 per cent decline in Japanese retail business since the war, and more than twenty Japanese business firms have closed down. When a local Japanese leader who had been held three weeks on charges of subversive activity asked that he be permitted to pledge property in lieu of cash for his \$25,000 bail since all his funds were frozen, the judge refused. He spent in jail the additional month the government said it needed to prepare its case. Health Department offices were swamped by Japanese-Americans who needed birth certificates to prove their citizenship so that they could keep their jobs or continue in business.

Undoubtedly the rapid and widely publicized measures taken by the federal government against enemy aliens helped to prevent race riots. It wouldn't have taken much to turn against the local Japanese the mob of 2,000 that broke twenty-six plate-glass windows of stores left lighted during Seattle's first blackout. Newspaper accounts of the murder of a Seattle Chinese during a blackout on December 12 were written on the assumption that the man had been mistaken for a Japanese. Local Chinese and Filipinos felt it advisable to start wearing identifying buttons and putting emblems on their cars. It was suggested that all Japanese be interned for their own protection. The fire that broke out on December 14 in Seattle's public market, in which many stalls are tended by Japanese and Italians, was put down as of incendiary origin.

As the suspect list grows and the FBI becomes increasingly overburdened, faith in its power to shadow effectively more than 100,000 first- and second-generation Japanese is called into question by panic-minded vigilantes, who would, old Western style, take the law into their own hands. Although there is no record of any sabotage so far, the government's establishment of "prohibited areas" and curfew regulations has been roundly denounced as "short of protection." A committee of West Coast Congressmen has unanimously agreed that all Japanese, aliens and citizens alike, should be moved from the West Coast. A feasible compromise would be to leave on the Coast those Japanese whose businesses are essential and have them carry on under surveillance of the FBI, which, while constantly on the alert against possible sabotage, would also, and equally for the sake of war efficiency, suppress the ancient Western curse of vigilante rule.

If Singapore Falls

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

IN A campaign whose quick triumphs must make Hitler envious Japan has greatly weakened its opponents and seized nearly everything that the military experts had predicted would be lost. The price it has paid in men, ships, and planes has been considerable; yet its conquests have been cheap in proportion to their ultimate value.

The key to Japanese success has been largely air and sea superiority in the vital theater of operations. Much of this superiority rests in turn upon favoring geography. Japan's targets are isolated and lie at the end of what are for us fantastically long lines of communication. Hence they are hard to reinforce, and Japan can bring against any one of them all the strength at its command in sufficient superiority to achieve victory. The full exploitation of these natural advantages has been greatly aided by the blunders of the Allies.

For the gains which can be attributed largely to unfavorable geography we may spare all tears. Most of them are not vital and can ultimately be recovered, provided the war runs sufficiently in our favor in other fields. Save for Luzon's iron, which is badly needed by Japan but is insufficient to make up for the Anglo-American embargo on scrap, no significant additions to the Japanese economy have been obtained. Far more serious both economically and strategically are the gains in Malaya, Borneo, Celebes, Tarakan, and the islands near New Guinea. They constitute breaches in the outer ramparts of vital Allied defense lines. But the Japanese, though now within close striking distance of points absolutely vital to the United Nations, have not yet won their campaign.

The important question at present is whether we have learned enough from our defeats to turn them into later victories. Immediately before December 7 most Americans were overconfident to the point of smugness. For thirty-five years prior to 1941 the possibility of a war with Japan was never absent from American calculations, and during most of this time Japan was Potential Public Enemy Number One. Seldom in this long period did responsible students of war underestimate the Japanese. But in 1940 and 1941 the sharp successes of Hitler turned our eyes in his direction. With a navy thoroughly adequate only for an offensive in one ocean at a time, the Administration tended to concentrate attention on Europe and the Atlantic. Hence during the period that Americans were becoming convinced of the menace of Nazi Germany they made the mistake of underestimat-

ing the Japanese. Even plans for a total war prepared after July, 1941, were based on the invalid assumption that we could win in the Far East without undertaking an all-out offensive.

In the absence of definite information it is difficult to know what is now passing through the minds of our war planners and whether they are still underestimating Japan. But Secretary Knox's insistence that Germany is our main enemy and the lack of alarm in Senator Connally's admission that we were quite likely to lose Singapore are not reassuring. Overconfidence seems to have survived in the form of a belief that Japan's gains in the Far East are not vital and that it will be relatively easy to regain lost ground once we have beaten Germany.

Actually, neither of these assumptions is a safe guide for conducting the war. Japan has now made all the gains it can make without gravely jeopardizing our chances of winning the war or, at best, of achieving victory without a long, exhausting struggle. Its every advance has made it less possible for us to bring land-based air power to bear against Japan's homeland. At the same time Japan's acquisition of air bases has greatly increased its own offensive capacities. Singapore must be held for its value as a stronghold, even though its value as a naval base has been temporarily destroyed and the United Nations now have no seat of operations within the war zone capable of supporting the naval power required for an offensive. Conquests already made have greatly increased Japan's supply of rubber, oil, tin, and iron. Additional gains in the Netherlands Indies will further diminish our ability to use economic deprivation as an important weapon. Simultaneously, loss of access to tin and rubber threatens to weaken our own economy. And with every piece of ground given up, our chances of ultimately taking the offensive from nearby bases are diminished.

But would Japan stop with the Indies? Certainly not, unless sufficient force is made available to stay its progress. Gestures at weakly guarded Australia and a flank attack on the Burma road are already occupying its attention. India is the next objective, and if the Japanese can attack it successfully they will be in position to carry out a gigantic pincers movement with the Germans against the British in Mesopotamia and the Near East. Once past Singapore they will be able to send raiders into the Indian Ocean and disrupt not only sea communications with Australia and India but the supply line to British armies in Libya and Syria. The British Isles would then

be more dependent upon the United States than ever before, and shipping needed to transport man-power to fight against Germany and Japan would have to be diverted to carrying food and other supplies to England. We should then be fighting a bitter defensive war in which regaining what we had lost would be a thousand times harder than we should have found sparing the force necessary to defend it successfully in the beginning. Japan has only to extend its present conquests far enough in order to win the war.

The first step toward victory must be a realization that the defensive strategy envisaged prior to December 7, if followed, will only lose the war. Our leaders should also recognize that the most pressing problem is that of defeating the Axis where it is offering the greatest threat, namely, in the Far East. Nazi Germany may be a greater menace to the American way of life than the war lords of Japan, but this fact, if true, does not imply that Hitler should have complete priority in our war plans. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the British Empire were and are the greatest obstacles to the realization of his dreams of world domination, but Hitler did not begin his career as a conqueror by attacking them.

Our immediate military task is to stop Japan. To do this we should first of all get command of the air. The Administration apparently realizes this and is devoting considerable energy to reinforcing air squadrons in the

Far East. Both our planes and our personnel have already demonstrated their superiority over their opponents and have inflicted heavy losses, but we have not had enough planes for them to constitute a decisive factor. Pursuit planes must be transported very largely aboard ship since they lack radius for long flights. This necessity is not proving a serious handicap, however, for bombers able to fly to the Far East under their own power have in actual fighting often been more than a match for enemy interceptors.

The second step, and one almost essential to ultimate victory, is the relief of Singapore. Naval aid is probably out of the question, and air reinforcement is not enough. A land offensive from southern China and Burma into Thailand and Malaya is badly needed to relieve pressure. Time may be required to transport large forces to the scene of hostilities, but it must be cut as short as possible. If this offensive is not practicable, Singapore's defenders must hold their position at all costs and, if ultimately forced to yield, must so completely demolish the base as to prevent its easy utilization by Japan.

These two steps will not in themselves win the war, but they are necessary preludes if an all-out offensive is to operate under reasonably good conditions. Whether victory will still be possible if we are unable to carry them out is something nobody knows. It will certainly be long and difficult of achievement.

Jesse Jones, Reluctant Dragon

BY DWIGHT MACDONALD

II

IN GENERAL, the personalities of public men affect the course of events less than journalists pretend. But in the case of Jesse Jones, personality is closely integrated with policy. The kind of a man he is explains both how Jones has managed to intrench himself so firmly in power and why his policies have been sterile in peace time, ruinous in war time. As Fainsod and Gordon put it in their recently published "Government and the American Economy," "the confidence which RFC has engendered in both Congress and the country at large is a function of the cautious manner in which it has administered its duties. The record has been closely associated with the personality of Jesse Jones."

Jesse Jones is sixty-seven years old, and his personal fortune has been put as high as \$100,000,000 (pre-1929). He is a heroic model of the traditional American business virtues, suitable for adorning the façades of post offices: six feet three, with a handsome silvery head and a commanding presence; works twelve hours a day;

plays bridge and poker for relaxation; spends hours every day on the long-distance phone, his end of the conversation being pretty much limited to "Yes" and "No." Like the elder Morgan, he shone in only one subject at school—arithmetic. Jesse never went beyond grade school, not because of poverty—his father was a moderately prosperous tobacco farmer—but because he wanted to start making money. ("How the hell do you spell 'through'?" he is said to have asked, in the agonies of composing a recent speech.) His scorn for theorists, intellectuals, and such odd fish is huge, and he makes no secret of the fact that he has read only one book in the last ten years. The book was "Gone with the Wind."

But Jones is a business man of a special kind. He is, first of all, a Southerner of the breed of his close friends Jack Garner and Carter Glass, which means he combines provincial small-town conservatism with a dislike for "Wall Street." The dislike, being based simply on the struggle between the local banker and his big-city competitor, is superficial compared to the more general

right-wing philosophy, and for all his baiting of Wall Street on interest rates Jones can be depended on to stand firm with the Street on any crucial issue. Jones is, secondly, a real-estate operator and banker; his wealth is notable among Texas fortunes for being based on neither oil nor cotton. Banks, hotels, insurance companies, utilities, and real estate in Fort Worth, Dallas, and especially Houston—these are the components of his private empire. It takes quite different qualities to make money



Jesse Jones

in those fields than in either speculation or entrepreneurial risk-taking, qualities with which Jones seems to be well endowed—secretiveness, caution, diplomacy, patience, acquisitiveness, and the instinct for sitting tight and waiting for interest payments. The nicknames his enemies give him are complimentary *noms de guerre*—"Jesse James," "Ten Per Cent Jones."

Thirdly, Jones has always been a good deal of a politician. He has taken care to own newspapers and radio stations as well as real estate. He has long been a power in the Democratic Party; it was his personal check for \$200,000 that brought the 1928 convention to Houston. He is a formidable negotiator and intriguer, expert in getting on with people he wants to get on with. His extraordinary hold over Congress—he has been called the most influential lobbyist in Washington—is partly based on his finesse in handling Congressmen. He makes a point of always receiving a Congressman who wants to present a petitioner for a loan; if the loan goes through, the Congressman gets the credit; if it doesn't, at least the petitioner feels his Congressman has done everything possible for him.

But it was more than Jones's diplomatic adroitness that made Senator Vandenberg recently declare, "I think Mr. Jones more generally holds the confidence of Congress than any other member of the Roosevelt Administration"; or that made Senator Byrd say, after the defeat of Roosevelt's "lend-lease" bill in the summer of 1939, "I would have voted for the bill if Jesse Jones had been put in charge of the money"; or that made Representative Ham Fish comment, during the debate on extending the RFC's powers last spring, "I believe that this fund is in safe hands. I would bet on Jesse Jones to outguess and outbargain Hitler and Mussolini." Representative

Fish has long since lost his bet, but he was right about the "safe hands," from his point of view. Congressmen trust Jones because they think he will not "abuse" his powers, that is, use them to alter the economic status quo. Their faith is not misplaced.

The Jones policies have been pleasing to Congress, and disastrous to the war program, because they are based on two premises: (1) the RFC must be conducted in a "businesslike," that is, a "profitable," manner—or, more generally expressed, the RFC is an end and not a means to an end; (2) the conduct of the war must not be such as to disturb the existing balance of class and economic forces.

Defending his stewardship of the RFC before the Truman committee, Jones said, "We are negotiating contracts . . . as rapidly as good business permits." As recently as last August, therefore, Jones was *spending*—as against earmarking for future commitments—his vast funds at the rate of a mere fifty millions a month. This is perfectly sound policy if one regards, as Jones evidently does, the RFC as a corporation analogous to United States Steel, with the people of the United States in the role of stockholders and Jones in the role of the manager who must show a profit. In that case it becomes Jones's duty to hold back for months, as he did, a \$9,000,000 loan for a new magnesium process, until he was sure it would work—and this in the summer of 1940 when the whole plane program was imperiled by a shortage of magnesium; and to say, as he did, to those who urged him last summer to finance 100,000 tons of synthetic-rubber capacity, "Why put all that money into plants making rubber that would cost 40 cents a pound when you can get it for 18.5 cents in the Far East?" But from the point of view of an effective war program, in which the RFC's "stockholders" are perhaps even more vitally interested than in the "profit" their corporation may show, these two decisions of Chairman Jones, like most of his other decisions, were excruciatingly mistaken; as mistaken, for instance, as was another state-capitalist enterprise, the Maritime Commission, which according to *Fortune* "showed a tendency to fill its ships' holds with high-paying cargoes like tapioca and sugar while manganese and chromite waited on the docks of foreign ports." If the United States loses the war, it will go down to defeat in a thoroughly solvent condition.

Just as the chairman of United States Steel is always talking about his sacred obligations to his stockholders, so the chairman of the RFC talks, no doubt with entire sincerity, of his obligation to see that the public gets full value for the money intrusted to him. And in truth he is ever vigilant against petty raiders of the public purse; it is only the really big fellows that he has trouble keeping an eye on. Like other watchdogs he is death on tramps but is liable not to open his mouth when a well-dressed

gentleman enters by the front door and walks off with the family silver. There was the now notorious aluminum contract he negotiated last fall in a series of man-to-man talks with President Davis of Alcoa, talks so intimate that neither the OPM nor the War Department nor even the two participants' own lieutenants were let in on them. The contract aroused such protests when it was made public that Jones was forced to revise it in several important respects. A little later he did some more man-to-man "trading" with President Grace of Bethlehem Steel, and once more left the conference room without his pants. The Bethlehem contract hasn't been made public yet, but it is rumored to be even more remarkable than the Alcoa agreement. Even Jones seems to have been a little worried about this deal, but his hands were tied. "He might have cracked down on Bethlehem publicly," explain the editors of *Fortune*, "but to Jones that would be coercion. 'After all,' he observes, 'this is still a democracy.'"

The interesting concept of the democratic right of big business to remain unmolested by public opinion leads us to the second premise behind Jones's policies—the sanctity of the status quo. His respect for the present order of things goes far beyond any vulgar national interests, as his "trades" with the Anglo-Dutch tin and rubber cartels demonstrate. After a year and a half of negotiating Jesse has emerged with half the Bolivian output of tin, enough to supply about one-fifth the country's normal peace-time needs, plus a smelting plant in Texas—no one ever accused him of slighting his native state—which was originally scheduled for completion early this year and is now postponed until the middle of the summer. The other half of the Bolivian ore still crosses the Atlantic to be smelted in England and then reshipped here, in the good old-fashioned way. The Texas smelter is to be run by the Dutch firm of N. V. Billiton, an influential member of the tin cartel. The record in rubber by now is painfully clear to everyone. The RFC set up the Rubber Reserve Company on July 1, 1940. A full year later the RRC had acquired—in the open market, as the cartel saw to it—just 218,000 tons of rubber from the Far East, about four months' normal peace-time supply. By the time the war broke out, this had increased to 600,000 tons, a year's supply. According to the *United States News* of January 2, the Anglo-Dutch rubber cartel "limited the amount to be sold, in fear that excessive stocks in the United States might break the price if the war ended." Big business—American, British, or Dutch—speaks the same language everywhere. Although his funds happen to be government and not private money, Jesse Jones speaks in that idiom also. In the world of 1942 it is the language of defeat.

Jones is responsible not only for strengthening the clutch of big business on our productive mechanism but also for delaying the whole plant-expansion program in

order to do so. Soon after the Defense Plant Corporation was set up in August, 1940, a disagreement on policy arose between Schram, then RFC chairman, and Jones, nominally completely out of the RFC but actually still its boss. Schram had worked out, after some trial and error, a standardized contract which greatly simplified and speeded up the negotiations between defense manufacturers and the DPC, and which also had the effect of giving everybody equal treatment. Jones objected strongly to these standard contracts; he wanted to "trade" individually in each case, partly because he liked to show his prowess at bargaining, partly because he had always done it that way, and no doubt partly because Schram in the whole DPC affair had shown more independence than Jones likes in his lieutenants. Schram, however, was able to carry his point—until Jones, by skilful maneuvering inside the RFC, made his position impossible and pushed him out and into the presidency of the New York Stock Exchange. After that Jones took over completely, and the standard contract went out the window, though it apparently had been popular with most of the manufacturers. Every contract was the result of interminable "trading" in Jesse's office. The result, whether Jones consciously intended it or not, has naturally been that the more powerful the corporation the better the "trade" it gets out of Jones, so that the RFC's vast plant-building activity simply reproduces on a larger scale the present balance of forces in the economy. This orderly dispensation was quite impossible with Schram's egalitarian standard contracts.

The tempest of war has already laid low Stettinius, Biggers, and many a lesser dollar-a-year man, while that ancient oak, Knudsen, creaks in the gale. But Jesse Jones still stands firm and will not be easily uprooted. We have already noted his hold over Congress. He also commands the confidence of Wall Street and business generally; as the master of the most powerful financial institution in the country, Jesse Jones bridges in his own person the chasm that usually divides the conservatism of small town and big business. He has, thirdly, created an invisible empire of personal followers. *Time* calls the RFC "Washington's No. 1 big-money employment office," and "Jesse's boys" are as famous as Frankfurter's "happy hot dogs" were in an earlier period. A spectacular early coup was getting the chairmanship of Chicago's biggest bank, Continental-Illinois, at \$75,000 a year, for Jesse's good friend Walter J. Cummings, at the time treasurer of the Democratic National Committee. Silliman Evans, publisher of Marshall Field's Chicago *Sun*, is an old Jones man and beneficiary, as is Bascom Timmons, the *Sun's* Washington correspondent. A few recent Jones placements may be noted: Roger Whiteford as president of Associated Gas and Electric; Leo Crowley as president of Standard Gas and Electric; W. B. Yeager as

president of the International Utilities Corporation; Stewart McDonald as chairman of the Maryland Casualty Company; and, of course, President Schram of the New York Stock Exchange.

The fourth base of Jesse Jones's power is his control of the RFC. In his nine years as chairman he has built a bureaucratic hierarchy which has no parallel in Washington. "We think Jesse Jones is God around here," is the simple way Sam Husbands puts it. Husbands is one of the five directors who, in legal fiction, run the RFC. (Who can name another?) These gray anonymities—"expert hint-takers" is the best characterization of the species—are simply extensions of the personality of Jesse Jones. It has been years since Jones has bothered to attend an RFC board meeting; he knows there will be no shadow of disagreement since he has decided everything in advance himself. Jones took care to see that the recalcitrant Emil Schram's successor as RFC chairman was a sixty-eight-year-old Democratic politician named Charles B. Henderson, who gives the impression he will stand without hitching. In running this well-oiled machine Jones exhibits the classic traits of bureaucracy: a constant push to expand his domain, in competition with other governmental agencies; a tendency to make the preservation and good health of the RFC an end instead of a means; a preference for personal methods of administration, for a government of men, not laws; and, above all, the concentration of such power in his own hands that criticism from within or without his organization can have little effect on his policies.

There should be several lessons for us in the case of Jesse Jones.

It should raise serious doubts, or rather strengthen the doubts being expressed more and more widely, as to the ability of this country to win the war—and to win the peace—if the productive effort at home is to continue to be dominated by big business and the conservative elements in Congress and the Administration. As for winning the peace, here is what Chairman Henderson of the RFC has to say about what will be the major domestic issue after the war, namely, the disposition of the vast productive plant now being built with government funds: "Whatever loans we make for new plants we shall never use to make those plants into government plants in competition with private ones. . . . We seek always to make private enterprise stronger because we believe in it. . . . Our policy is based on the conviction that this will always be a country of free enterprise." It must be noted also that President Roosevelt is on record as a believer in Chairman Henderson's "free enterprise."

It should demonstrate that the mere appointment of a war-production "czar" with wide powers is not a solution of the problem. In his field Jones has had undisputed one-man authority, signed and sealed by the United

States Congress; he is not averse to the exercise of authority; yet his record is as bad as anybody's, perhaps a little worse.

It should knock on the head the idea that state intervention is of itself necessarily efficient. Throughout these articles I have called Jones a "state capitalist," and yet I agree with Hilferding that "the concept of 'state capitalism' does not stand any analysis from the economic point of view": since "the capitalist economy is a market economy," an economy in which the state, not the market, determines production is not in any real sense capitalist. Thus "state capitalism" is a theoretical impossibility, a monster uniting mutually irreconcilable principles. Yet it *does* exist today in this country, this mythical monster, and it is the cause of most of our difficulties with war economy. Our problem is similar to England's, as described recently by the Oxford economist, T. Balogh: "In Britain the Civil Service sees its function at most in a control which is superimposed on a basically unchanged economic structure. It refuses to take the initiative. Thus a permanent negative character is given to the war economy" (*New Republic*, December 8, 1941). So, too, over here we are finding that if state corporations like the RFC merely compete with private corporations within the same capitalist framework, and if the authority of the state is merely superimposed on the old pattern of monopoly capitalism, the result is less productive efficiency than you get under either complete "free enterprise" or a basically changed economy such as exists in Germany and Russia. In this war unreconstructed Neanderthal capitalists like Henry Ford and Tom Girdler have a better record of war production than their more docile colleagues who have played in with the Administration. Either the profit motive or the social motive may be a spur to economic effort, but a compromise between the two seems to take the dynamism out of both. What we see in the RFC is a combination of the vices of private capitalism and state bureaucracy.

Finally, the case of Jesse Jones should be one more indication of the falsity of a thesis which should have been pretty well discarded by now anyway: that there is any particular virtue, from a democratic, progressive point of view, in state enterprise. The RFC and the other government corporations under Jones's control have been run in the most bureaucratic and dictatorial manner, and their policies have had the effect of strengthening all that is undemocratic in our economic system. A shift of power toward state capitalism of this kind cannot be called an advance toward democracy. It is true that Jones himself is a conservative and not a potential fascist. But his policies, by blocking the road to any democratic solution of our social and economic war problems, are making straight the path of some future native totalitarian movement.

[Part I of this article was published last week.]

Hitler's Shanghaied Volunteers

BY JOACHIM JOESTEN

AMONG the hundreds of thousands from the ranks of the invading army who have fallen before Moscow are not only Germans who died for Führer and Fatherland but "crusaders" whom Adolf Hitler's agents had recruited from every corner of occupied or unoccupied Europe to "fight against Bolshevism." In this motley force were a sprinkling of genuine volunteers, seeking adventure or burning to drive the Reds from Europe, large numbers of mercenaries willing to fight anywhere for pay, and regiments of hapless serfs sold by their Quisling governments to the Führer, as the princes of Hesse used to sell their subjects to the kings of England.

Less than a week after Hitler's surprise attack on Russia the German press began to beat the drums for the "holy war" against Bolshevism. The call was echoed in local Nazi papers all over Europe. Varying according to local temperament and circumstances, appeals of many kinds were used to arouse the crusading spirit. In Norway, Denmark, Holland, the Flemish parts of Belgium, and other so-called Germanic countries, racial solidarity was played up. The Swedes were reminded of their old feud with Russia, and the hoary bogey of pan-Slav expansion toward the Atlantic was again paraded. In all the Scandinavian countries brotherly feelings for "poor little Finland" were skilfully manipulated. Spanish Phalangists were called upon to avenge Soviet intervention in the civil war. In France, occupied or unoccupied, Switzerland, Hungary, and some other countries, anti-Communist feeling and religious sentiments provided the best platform. Finland and Rumania were easily dragged into the war on national grounds: recovery of lost territory and further expansion to the east were promised to them. Vassal Mussolini received orders to join up.

Wherever the Germans found that racial, social, or religious motives were insufficient to assure the success of the recruiting campaign they resorted to promises and threats. In occupied France, for example, the recruiting agents promised each man who joined the volunteer legion that one or more of his relatives held as prisoners of war would be set free. In Denmark the chief recruiting officer, Johannes Haavrad, asserted that the future independence of the country hinged on participation in the "crusade." The text of his announcement read:

For each battalion of the Nordland Regiment or Free Corps repatriated to Denmark [after service in Russia] one regiment of occupation troops will depart, and the

last occupation troops will leave when the whole corps is established here in Denmark.

Perhaps the most barefaced pressure was applied in Norway. In the first days of July, 1941, all Norwegian newspapers received these confidential instructions:

All newspapers in Norway must carry daily, throughout this week, in a conspicuous place, the announcement regarding enlistment in the Norwegian Legion which was first published in the morning papers of July 1. The announcement, which must be printed free of charge, shall contain the address of the recruiting office or offices within the area of circulation of the paper or in the vicinity. Oslo newspapers need only indicate recruiting offices in Oslo. The papers shall also carry every day this week either an article or a pictorial feature on the subject of "Fight Against Bolshevism."

In the same month the Quisling-controlled "Civil Administration for the Army and Navy" in Oslo sent out circulars urging all Norwegian officers to enlist as volunteers in the fight against Bolshevism or, the circular added ominously, to explain their failure to do so. One of the recipients sent the following reply by return mail:

In answer to your letter dated July 10, 1941, urging me to explain my refusal to accept service with the German forces in Russia, I have to inform you that my negative reply was motivated by the consideration that Norway since April 9, 1940, has been, and continues to be, at war with Germany.

How many foreign volunteers did Hitler manage to rally to his flag in this way? Very few authentic figures are available, and private advices have been extremely conflicting on this point. It seems fairly certain, however, that at the height of the Nazi advance into Russia upward of 50,000 foreign legionaries were fighting at the front or garrisoning the rear. This estimate does not take into account the Italian troops, or the Finns, Rumanians, Hungarians, and Slovaks, who were in the field as allies of Germany.

By far the largest contingent of "volunteers" against Russia was the so-called "Blue Division" from Spain. After a singularly unsuccessful attempt to draw enough genuine volunteers from his starving people to form a major army unit, General Franco last August decided to requite the Führer's services during the civil war by placing a full-dress division of regular troops at his disposal. Being ill-equipped for service in a Russian winter campaign, the "Blue Division" gave a very bad account of itself and finally met with disaster in the great

Soviet counter-offensive around the turn of the year. According to latest reports, more than 8,000 Spaniards lost their lives in the retreat from Moscow.

A French Volunteer Legion was organized last September by the famous Cagoulard chief Eugène Deloncle, with Laval and Déat as sponsors and with the blessing of Marshal Pétain. One of its officers was Jacques Doriot, the ex-Communist leader who became one of France's leading fascists. This French legion was one of Hitler's pet creations. It enjoyed many privileges and received better pay than the other foreign units. Privates drew between 2,400 and 3,000 francs a month, officers as much as 6,000 to 8,400 francs. According to its sponsors, the legion had gathered, by the middle of October, more than 30,000 recruits, though it is doubtful whether more than one-fifth of that number ever reached the front. It served in Russia under the command of Colonel Jean Labonne and was crushed in the Mozhaïsk sector by General Antonov's combined tank and cavalry attacks. Doriot vanished mysteriously after the Battle of Mozhaïsk.

Numerically inferior to the Spanish and French contingents, the Swedish volunteers were vastly superior in terms of military efficiency. Exactly how many of them have been fighting at any given time I cannot say, for the Swedish government has taken great care to keep the figure secret. But a correlation of items in the Swedish press indicates that from 4,000 to 5,000 saw service last year. Most of these volunteers enlisted with the Swedish Volunteer Corps formed at the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet war under the auspices of Major Nils Palme, Finland's military attaché in Stockholm. While nominally attached to the Finnish army, this corps was financed, equipped, and officered by Swedes. It took a prominent part in the fighting before Leningrad and in eastern Karelia. After the fall of Hangö, the corps was ostensibly disbanded, having "accomplished its task," but not all of its members went home.

Whereas the Swedish Volunteer Corps was formed with at least the tacit approval of the Swedish authorities, another contingent of volunteers was not so favorably regarded in Stockholm. This was the Swedish section of the famous "Viking Division," a German military unit made up partly of Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, and Dutch regiments, partly of Nazi troops formerly stationed in those countries. The "Vikings" fought in the Ukraine and suffered a crushing defeat when the Russian armies recaptured Rostov. Recruiting of Swedish citizens, and even of Swedish military personnel, for service with this German army division went on for more than two months in Sweden before the authorities at last intervened to stop what had become a public scandal. The chief recruiting agent was Captain Bertram Schmiterlów, a high-ranking officer of the Swedish General Staff who worked in close association with the German military

attaché in Stockholm. The two men used particular insistence in urging Swedish officers and privates to enlist. Volunteers were instructed to submit, through the agency of the German legation, an application to the King for exemption from Swedish military service.

Other units of the Viking Division were the Standarte (regiment) Nordland, made up of Norwegian Quislings, the Standarte Westland, recruited from Dutch and Belgian Nazi parties, and the Danish Free Corps.

Norway's tragic cleavage is reflected in the formation of the Nordland Regiment. While many loyal Norwegian officers and men are fighting with the Allied armies and thousands of others are in German concentration camps, a by no means negligible fraction has accepted service with the enemy. General Frölich-Hansen, Colonel Sten, Lieutenant Colonels Eggan, Berkak, and Numedal, Majors Kjelstrup, Bjerkelund, Kielland, Omdahl, and Knudsen, Captains Sverre Gröner, Odd Graham, Lorentz, and Hagen are only a few outstanding names on this roll of dishonor.

Last October the Oslo radio station broadcast, rather unwisely, 350 names of Norwegians serving with the Viking Battalion, then undergoing training in Germany. Most of the names on the list were clearly understood in this country, and a Norwegian-language weekly, the *Nordisk Tidende* of Brooklyn, published about 120 of them in its issue of October 30, 1941. The legionaries some day may not feel too happy about this publicity, for in the meantime the Norwegian government in London has issued a decree making deserters and traitors liable to the death penalty after the expected Allied victory.

It appeared from this same broadcast that Vidkun Quisling himself had shortly before inspected the Vikings' training camp near Hanover and passed the men in review. The ceremony ended with a speech by the battalion commander, Major Jørgen Bakke, and this oath spoken in chorus by the volunteers:

I swear to God this holy oath that I shall always be ready to give my life in the fight against Bolshevism like a brave and faithful soldier of Adolf Hitler. Heil Quisling!

The story of how the Danish Free Corps was organized and is being used provides a good illustration of what Hitler meant when he extended his "protection" to the Danes two years ago. It is a long story of pressure and threats, belying time and again Germany's solemn pledge, made on the day of the invasion, that Denmark's independence would be respected and that there would be no interference with the country's internal affairs.

Immediately after the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet war the Danish Nazi paper *Fædrelandet* began to urge all men between seventeen and forty to enlist with the newly set-up Danish division of the Nordland Regiment. This propaganda was unlawful, for Danish citizens are ex-

PLICITLY forbidden by law to enlist in a foreign military service. The Danish government, however, under Nazi pressure, not only refrained from enforcing the law but expressly authorized the formation of a Danish Free Corps and appointed a high-ranking Danish officer, Lieutenant Colonel P. C. Kryssing of the Holbaek artillery, to head it. Press and radio were directed by the chief censor, Karl Eskelund, and his unofficial boss, the German "press attaché," Dr. Meissner, to support the recruiting campaign with editorials, feature articles, advertisements, and broadcasts.

The first battalion of the Danish Free Corps departed for Germany on July 19, and a large motorized contingent followed on September 23, en route to a training camp "somewhere in eastern Germany." According to *Faedrelandet*, a total of 3,000 Danish volunteers had been recruited by the end of the year, but nothing has been heard yet of their exploits, if any, in Russia.

To obtain cannon-fodder for his Russian adventure was not Adolf Hitler's only object in calling on Europe's youth to join his "crusade against Bolshevism." Another, hidden purpose played perhaps a greater part in the scheme. The chief backers of the recruiting drive in every country were the local Nazi parties and affiliated organizations, like the Rexists in Belgium and the Cagoulards in France. This meant that each volunteer corps had a nucleus of staunch Nazi sympathizers around which were gathered adventurers, careerists, and plain thugs—just such a mixture as made up the original Nazi storm troops, the S. A. and S. S. And in accordance with the same pattern the Norwegian, Danish, and similar units were incorporated not into a regular *Wehrmacht* division but into a division of the so-called *Waffen S. S.*, made up of élite S. S. troops. The resemblance of their internal structure to that of the Blackshirts, plus their incorporation in Hitler's praetorian guard, indicates the ultimate purpose for which these volunteer units were created. After the final victory the men of the Nordland Regiment and Free Corps are to go home and take over the control of their respective fatherlands from the hands of the occupation army.

That this is the role the Führer has planned for his foreign legion appears also from the frank statement of the Danish recruiting officer Johannes Haavrad which I quoted above. Further evidence is found in the disclosure recently made by a loyal Norwegian newspaper that some of the Swedish volunteers recruited for the *Waffen S. S.* were never sent to Russia, or even to Germany, but were ordered to Norway instead, to help subdue the rebellious patriots there. Late reports from the conquered countries indicate that a new recruiting drive has been started to fill the gaps in the German divisions on the eastern front, but that it is meeting with little success. The news of the slaughter in Russia is getting about.

In the Wind

A CADILLAC DEALER in Boston, A. L. Danforth, has sent the following printed notice to his customers: "I think the smart thing for you to do would be to pick out a new car and let us hold it for you in the hope that between you and ourselves we could help you secure a priority for same. If we can secure a priority and you want the car you picked out, you can have it, but if you don't want same—okay."

THE NAZI BUND of New Hyde Park, Long Island, a center of pro-fascist and Coughlinite activity, has become the New Hyde Park Fishing and Hunting Club. On a recent outing the club raided the local synagogue and Hebrew school.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT has been placing stories critical of the various "free" movements in many newspapers. Walter Winchell, who often writes on tips from the department, recently reported that the government was planning to crack down on "racketeering" free groups.

YOU PAYS YOUR MONEY: An American just back from Mexico City reports peddlers on the streets who carry one tray full of swastika emblems, another full of V-for-Victory pins.

A PROBABLE REASON for the Dies committee's special animosity against Goodwin Watson is to be found in a study Watson prepared for the Federal Communications Commission just before Congress voted him out of a job. The report, which has never been officially released, showed Martin Dies among the five Americans who received the largest number of favorable mentions over the Berlin radio in 1941.

PETITIONS bearing thousands of names and demanding that the famous "Oklahoma book trials" be dropped have reached Governor Leon C. Phillips. The Governor has turned the petitions over to the FBI with the recommendation that all signers be promptly investigated.

ALTHOUGH AMERICAN CENSORSHIP has been in force since Pearl Harbor, practically no mail from countries in the Western Hemisphere has been opened. Now, however, the censorship is being applied to all mail from Lower California, where there is a large concentration of Japanese.

HARPER AND BROTHERS, which recently withdrew Leon Trotsky's biography of Stalin, has decided not to publish G. E. R. Gedye's book on his experiences as New York *Times* correspondent in Moscow; and Doubleday, Doran will not issue the reminiscences of Alexander Barmine, former Soviet representative in Greece who fled to this country during the Moscow trials. Both Barmine's and Gedye's books were completed, but the publishers felt that the times are unpropitious for books critical of Russia.

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

A Native at Large

BY JONATHAN DANIELS

Portrait of America's Strength

WASHINGTON has sometimes seemed to me to be a very odd place in which to look at America. It is hard to see the country for the capital. There is one place in Washington, nevertheless, in which you can look at America and see it tough and strong, seeking and humorous, not too optimistic and not at all afraid. This is in the huge collection of photographs taken during the last decade under the direction of a gray, nearsighted man named Roy Stryker for the Farm Security Administration. All the pictures add up to the fact that America is people, and the good and the bad, the tough and the whipped, among them, looking up from the glossy prints, are better proof of the American strength than are the classic buildings along the landscaped streets.

I wish America could see its picture as Stryker's photographers have made it. The collection is by no means restricted to farms or to men on farms. And though it goes under the name of the Historical Section of the Farm Security Administration, there is nothing historical about the photographs except that they will show to tomorrow America's picture today. Undoubtedly some who want America in the pictures to look like America in the advertisements might not approve of a collection which includes migrants and slums as well as green pastures and Palm Beach. Maybe a lack of bathing beauties destroys the over-all coverage of the collection. But there are Negroes and ranchers in it, fishermen, mechanics, wise old women, and children like confections even if they stand before huts. There are men at work and men laughing. There are also wanderers, and people who look as if they had less hope than fear. The whole procession of the American years is in their faces. Every American problem and every American promise is in their eyes. Not many of the women are so photographed as artfully to display their legs. But men and women are so photographed as to show their continuing strength in the midst of an America which has not always been easy and is not easy now.

Not everybody who has seen these pictures is as enthusiastic about them as I am. Indeed, I know that an American advertising man, seeking, as a patriot, for pictures with which to serve America in war time, looked through a lot of them and then pronounced his verdict. "Too sordid," he said.

It would not do to show America with a face which could stand shaving, or sometimes washing, and with hands more accustomed to the machine than the manicure. Given this man's training, it is easy to understand his view. But I prefer the opinion of a man from one of the countries that the advertising man wanted to impress with American pictures. He was a Chilean. He looked through the pictures, too. Though his searching was not censored, he was still not led by the clerks in charge to the photographs which showed American difficulties at their saddest. But at last he came to pictures of Americans who have not had the easiest time in this land. Then the stranger from South America began to grow enthusiastic. "These pictures," he said, "would be useful to the United States among my people. They could see from them that Americans have not always had it easy—they could see that Americans have suffered, too."

That, I suppose, must be heresy among the propagandists. For all I know, it may be pure folly. Perhaps in convincing other peoples how strong we are it is essential to prove to them also that all of us are rich, that none of us have problems pushing hard behind us, that our strength is gymnastic and our smiles cinematic. But I wonder if that makes other people love us more dearly. I couldn't say. But I think I can say that however much it may profit us to try to fool other peoples in the name of patriotism, there is not any profit in a similar effort to fool ourselves. Of course, I don't expect a cadaverous tenant farmer to be set up as the typical American. But I do think that we can look at America everywhere, as it is, with our eyes closed to no difficulties, and still see so much strength that we can take more courage from the whole picture than we could possibly take from the half-picture which we know is the half-truth.

America is people. All kinds of them. And the amazing fact is that they seem heartier and more durable when they stand against an America which is a tough proposition for most of them though still the land best loved by all of them. I went slowly through the pile of their photographs. Reformers had used some of them before, and they stared up at me like reminders of old causes. But they looked up also like Americans who had not had it easy in peace and did not expect to have it easy in war. I saw the picture of a people who have suffered undoubtedly but who have never even begun to recognize the possibility that any nation could overcome America or push such Americans as themselves off their feet.

BOOKS *and the* ARTS

Concert Hall

BY W. R. RODGERS

Still as lizard on stone,
Whose color skids from the eye,
They sit with startled hearts
And watch the weasel-lean voice
Twisting its way, soft and deft,
Through the stuttering stones
Of notation, neat-footed,
Steel-tight and pistol-instant.

Thin and pauseless as wind
Threading through holes, and easy
As ice sliding on heat,
It flows piecelessly on!
The bold deliberate voice
Lovely as dolphins leaping
In caterpillar loops,

Quick as hawk flickering
Or swallow sweeping
Its whip-end over eaves,
Smooth as the water-ribbon
Brimming the slippery lip
Of the full mountain pool.

But jerked as broken stick,
Sudden as jagged spark,
It jumps from peak to peak
Of the high rocky air,
Till like ecstatic lark
Or rocket it reaches
Its last and topmost note.
And silence falls in the hall.
Like a fresh-gutted glove
That still retains the shape
Of the informing hand.

Obituary Page in War Time

BY OSCAR WILLIAMS

As I arise like Samson in the mist of falling walls
Into the upper strata of forty years I hear
Great sounds, the waters of the world eating away
The unmeasurable ever-deepening groove of time.

I hear also the skull-grenades out of the endless
Cup of the loins, the faces on the obituary page,
That hung unexploded on the century's bald air
Break into the bright of death, the noiseless light.

All were friends, I knew of their names, knew
That they devoted lifetimes to their public lives,
But shattered thus against the invisible at last
They spill down, minor fireworks in an age on fire.

Authority on turf, the Expert on horses for fifty years
Falls, and on a day stampeded by the world's values;
On the same day the Mexican Envoy; and the noted
Chemist
Follows leaving a trail of four wives and properties.

The insurance Head of the international corporation,
The Secretary of the seaside company, makers of foam,
The Lawyer from Atlantic City, all in a hurry;
None of these could wait till the end of the story.

Now I hear the bells of prosperous Christendom
Huddling in their niches and the voices that run
Down the rumorously veins of the aggregate conscience;
The mourning takes place behind private mountains.

I look through the bright cross cut into the door
And watch the mighty night sky, the storm of stones;
The church is still intrenched among the living ones,
The acrobatic traffic crossing swords of horns.

The harbor whistles like fountains arch the mind
As the city pours itself quickly around the survivors:
The heart facing heavily into its dénouement, asks
What is the sum of all these implacable subtractions?

The Negro's "Cultural Past"

THE MYTH OF THE NEGRO PAST. By Melville J. Herskovits. Harper and Brothers. \$4.

THIS volume is the first published result of a general study of the Negro in the United States sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation and directed by Dr. Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish social economist. However, as a matter of fact, this study embodies Professor Herskovits's latest and most comprehensive reply to students of the American Negro who do not accept his views concerning the survival of African culture among Negroes in the United States. In revealing the "ignorance" which other investigators have exhibited concerning African survivals, the author believes that he will show that the Negro has a "cultural past" which was not blotted out during slavery and that knowledge of this fact will undermine the assumptions that bolster race prejudice.

It is probably because Professor Herskovits conceives his task in this dual aspect that in the first pages of his study he confuses the issues involved. In his outline of the myth of the Negro's past he lumps together the conclusions of competent scholars and the opinions of obviously prejudiced

writers on the cultural background and racial characteristics of the Negro. The conclusions of such scholars as Robert E. Park, Edward B. Reuter, and Guy Johnson may be wrong, but they are not the result of race prejudice and should not be classed with the opinions of men who think that "Negroes are naturally of a childlike character." Moreover, the fact that competent Negro scholars do not find African cultural survivals in every phase of Negro life is no evidence that, unlike the Jew, they are ashamed of their past. Contrary to Professor Herskovits's statement concerning the attitude of educated Negroes toward their African heritage, it may be pointed out that many race-conscious educated Negroes with little regard for scientific knowledge ascribe the Negro's contributions to his African background.

For scholars and even educated laymen the real interest of this book is not its effort to prove that the Negro had a cultural background in Africa but its analysis of the extent to which African culture survives and still influences the behavior and institutions of the Negro. Professor Herskovits agrees on the whole with other students of the American Negro that African culture has not survived to the same extent in the United States as in Brazil, Dutch Guiana, and the West Indies. His description of the process by which the Negro lost his cultural heritage does not add anything to what other scholars have written. His criticism and modification of the work of other scholars are due to his central thesis—namely, that traces of African culture can be discovered in nearly every phase of Negro life. In order to support this thesis he has consulted practically every available source of information and has been able to provide adequate documentation for it by data gathered in the field of language and the arts.

The author's analysis of African survivals in the religious life of the Negro is also well grounded, though he indulges in a type of speculation that cannot be regarded as scientific proof of his thesis. For example, he holds that the large number of Baptists among Negroes is not to be explained by the proselyting among the slaves and the opportunity that the Baptist church provided for self-expression, but is due primarily to the fact that river priests were unpopular in Africa and were sold to slavers. When Professor Herskovits is unable to discover African culture patterns in the American Negro's behavior, he contends that the "spirit," the "feel" or "generalized attitudes," characteristic of African culture is present. Likewise, the "diplomacy," the "indirection," and the "pliability" of the American Negro are traced to his African background. These conclusions, based on speculation, are the logical consequence of the author's belief in the "toughness of culture." In some cases this belief leads him to ascribe diametrically opposed social phenomena to African backgrounds. For example, according to his analysis, both the family disorganization noted among lower-class Negroes, together with the important position of the mother in the family, and the stability of closely knit patriarchal families of acculturated mulattoes, indistinguishable from white, are ascribed to African culture. According to Professor Herskovits's analysis, spontaneous responses, imagination, and the acquisition of new habits and attitudes are ruled out of the Negro's effort to adapt his behavior to American civilization.

In making these rather severe criticisms of Professor

Herskovits's book, it is not the intention of the reviewer to imply that the book is without merit. In fact, the book is in a number of respects a distinct contribution to our knowledge of the American Negro and should certainly provide a corrective to facile generalizations concerning the survival of African culture in the United States. First, the author has shown that it is necessary to have a sound knowledge of the culture of the regions in Africa from which the slaves came before one can discuss intelligently the influence of African survivals on the behavior of American Negroes. Second, in the chapters dealing with the tribal origins of the American Negroes and their African cultural heritage he has presented the best succinct treatment available. Third, his treatment of the reaction of the Negro to slavery should destroy forever the prejudiced belief, which was given scientific authority by Sir Harry Johnston, that the Negro, having been fitted by nature for slavery, offered no resistance to enslavement. Fourth, in the sections dealing with Africanisms in the religious life, the language, and the arts of the Negro in the United States the author has provided on the whole the best critical analysis of the available data on the subject yet published. An appendix contains an excellent outline of directives for further study, comprising investigations to be carried on in areas of Africa from which Negroes were brought as well as in areas of Negro concentration in the New World.

Nevertheless, the reviewer cannot agree with the author that to establish the fact that the Negro had a "cultural past" and that the Negro's "cultural past" still influences his behavior will alter his status in American life. It is generally recognized by white Americans that the Chinese, Hindus, and Japanese have a cultural background, but this fact does not affect their status in the United States. Moreover, when Professor Herskovits says that the Negro problem is psychological—that African patterns of thought prevent the complete acculturation of the Negro—as well as economic and sociological, is he not saying that even more fundamental barriers exist between blacks and whites than are generally recognized?

E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER

Private Life in Nazi Germany

PEOPLE UNDER HITLER. By Wallace R. Deuel. Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$3.50.

GERMAN artists are forbidden to use the word "family" in the title of any picture showing fewer than four children. Such a picture may be titled "Herr und Frau Müller and Their Two Children," for example, but it may not be called "The Müller Family." Nor can bereaved relatives choose the kind of tombstone they wish to mark the grave of their beloved, for in Nazi Germany the dead are coordinated just as efficiently as the living. These are but two minor items culled from "People Under Hitler," but they convey more strikingly than many an elaborate exposition what life in the Third Reich is like. Mr. Deuel, who is well known to many for his news dispatches in the *Chicago Daily News* and the *New York Post*, has written an indispensable study of present-day life in Germany.

Deuel dissects Hitler the failure and Hitler the political genius; he attempts anew to explain the ancient phenomenon

of the two souls in the German breast; he has studied the men who surround the Führer and the extraordinary aggregate of evil that has poisoned everything German. But what sets his book apart is the degree to which he conveys the effects of Nazi depravity on the average human soul, on the everyday life of the little man and his family.

Deuel thinks that "Hitler's preposterous mustache has been more responsible than any other single factor for the world's inability to take him seriously in time." It deceived people about the true stature of the man behind it and about the depths of evil that propel him. And this has been true not only of observers in foreign countries; the Germans themselves found him preposterous—at first. Nor was it recognized in time why Hitler could become a symbol to millions, the symbol of their failures and their dreams.

The most alarming fact emerging from Deuel's account, and one to which inadequate attention has been devoted hitherto, is that the Nazis have actually succeeded, by fair means and foul, in perverting Germany into a mammoth breeding farm, where only prize stock, to wit, the Nazi élite, may breed—indeed, must breed, to populate the future *Lebensraum*. Those to whom the Nazis deny the right to have children may be sterilized. A large number have actually been killed as unfit, and others have been castrated. Deuel devotes a major part of his book to the Nazis' endeavors to achieve their "Brave New World," largely by changing and controlling procreation. What a shocking and sordid picture it is! As the author points out, the Nazi race theory is arming German foreign policy with a powerful weapon—the dazzling vision of world mastery achieved by virtue of "superior blood and superior numbers."

The lives of Germans are invaded and subordinated to this goal to such a degree that no vestige of privacy remains. According to Dr. Ley, "there is no such thing as a private individual in National Socialist Germany. The only person who is still a private individual . . . is somebody who is asleep." If, for example, a number of persons share the belief that a child is not the offspring of the man professing to be its father, the authorities may institute proceedings to establish paternity, even though the man may be quite willing to overlook his wife's infidelity. The state refuses to allow the child's origin to be concealed.

Miscegenation, of course, has been the Nazis' *bête noire* from the outset. Thirty-one legal decrees regulate marriage between Jews and "Germans or persons of similar blood." Here the complex concept of "race defilement," one of the worst crimes under Nazi law, enters the picture—it means that in a sexual union the Jewish partner racially defiles the Gentile partner. The Gentile partner does not commit "race defilement" but only "race treason," since according to Nazi logic a Gentile cannot defile a Jew.

Deuel shows many flashes of humor in discussing even this unlovely and unhumorous subject. In his chapter on feminine glamor he tells of the desperate Nazi campaign against powder and lipstick, which was reversed after five years when the authorities discovered that female drabness clashed with their population policy.

Deuel's book is a treasure-trove of information—an ideal combination of clean thinking, painstaking research, and brilliant journalism.

RUTH NORDEN

The Philippine Commonwealth

THE PHILIPPINES: A STUDY IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By Joseph Ralston Hayden. The Macmillan Company. \$9.

THE appearance of Professor Hayden's book at this time is strangely reassuring. Manila may be temporarily under a Japanese puppet government; American and Filipino defense forces may be falling back to the last line of resistance; the civilian population may be feeling the first harsh blows of Japan's military rule; in the days ahead the supreme test will come for the institutions which Professor Hayden describes so thoroughly. In the light of his analysis there can be little doubt that the aspirations of the Filipino people, encouraged and developed under forty years of American control, will survive. In these lies the doom of the Japanese invader.

This "Study in National Development" ought to be required reading for the kind of citizenship that must be developed not only in the Philippines but also, and perhaps more urgently, in the United States. The Japanese, too, might well take a lesson from these pages. For an understanding of the progress of the Philippines and of America's share and responsibility therein, no better guide could be found than Professor Hayden. As a visiting professor, as Vice-Governor and Acting Governor General, as Secretary of Public Instruction, he knew the country both before and during the early years of the Commonwealth. To his own personal experiences and observations in the Philippines have been added years of

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continuing study of the island's problems. His judgments are those of a competent, forthright, but friendly critic.

A wide range of subjects is covered in this book: the people themselves, the evolution of the Commonwealth form of government, all the departments of government, the party system, education, the language problem, health, and external relations, with particular attention to China, Japan, and the United States. For the most part, the author views with approval the institutions that have been developed in the islands, although he points out various weaknesses and dangers against which the Filipinos themselves must guard. Among these are the growing power of the presidential office, the lack of a sturdy opposition party, the evils in local government, the trend toward an unhealthy fiscal position.

Time and again, however, Mr. Hayden warns his readers not to measure the accomplishments of Americans or Filipinos in terms of perfection or to estimate the worth of political institutions in the Philippines against the background of America.

Knowledge of the handicaps which this people has overcome arouses admiration. Comprehension of the difficulties which they still face creates understanding. All told, there is little room for doubt that the Philippines possess the basic elements from which nations are created.

Of particular interest is the chapter on the defense of the islands, written of course before the outbreak of war in the Pacific, in which the actual and potential strength of the country is measured and the whole scheme of defense is weighed. Mr. Hayden outlines a possible invasion of the southern islands which might leave Manila and northern Luzon isolated and powerless, lacking control of the air and sea. He is skeptical about the effectiveness of the country's defenses and realistic about the increasing expense of adequate fortifications, but he recognizes that a country desiring to be free must take what steps it can to defend its independence. Here he makes a point that may be as valid in post-war reorganization as it was when it was written:

The financial problems connected with the present national defense program, as virtually all other problems of the Philippines, can be solved only if a degree of prosperity comparable to that which the Filipinos now enjoy can be maintained in the islands after 1946. No convincing evidence has been given that this can be accomplished except by the continuation of preferential trade between the United States and the Philippines for many years after the date now set for independence.

The following words, written before December 7, are of even greater significance in the light of events since that date. They have been given added weight by President Roosevelt's promise that the independence of the Philippines will be redeemed and protected.

Upon the conclusion of the present upheaval the United States will be unable to escape its share of the task of reorganizing the world for peace, in Asia as elsewhere. In this reorganization the Philippines will necessarily be considered not merely vis-a-vis America but as an essential element in the post-war order in East Asia. In that order the interests and the aspirations of the Philippine people, who in the time of the crisis unhesitatingly ranged themselves with the United States and the principles of human freedom, will not be disregarded.

CATHERINE PORTER

Balkan Journal

BALKAN CORRESPONDENT. By Derek Patmore. Harper and Brothers. \$3.

IN THE current war most Balkan countries have belied their bellicose reputation, and have got into trouble precisely because they attempted to avoid it. Only Greece and Yugoslavia were "wicked" in the sense of the French jingle: *C'est un animal méchant; quand on l'attaque, il se défend.* Since World War I Italy and Germany have become the rowdies, and they have, indeed, lived up to the best Balkan traditions. Nevertheless, a journalistic invasion of the Balkan capitals did precede the Fascist and Nazi armies.

Unlike some of his colleagues Mr. Patmore does not pretend to impart the "scientific" explanation of all Balkan mysteries and enigmas. His is rather a personal story—hence the title—interwoven with gruesome and thrilling adventures and distinguished by frankness and candid modesty. Being himself an author and a successful playwright, his keen observation and subtle sense of psychology throw a clear light on the dramatic sequence of events in the Rumanian tragedy. Occasionally, led astray by fairness, he attempts to exculpate the villains in the play. He has an excuse even for Codreanu, who was in his view honest, and for the Iron Guard, which he calls intensely patriotic. Even for King Carol, "who in reality was responsible for the political confusion in his country," an apology is found partly in his dictatorial inclination, inherited from the Romanov ancestry (why not from the Hohenzollern?), partly in a Freudian explanation of "his obstinate and loyal love for Madame Lupescu." Most interesting is the account of German intrigues, both in Rumania and in Bulgaria. In spite of the cautious policy of King Boris, the outcome was the same in both countries—enslavement by the Nazis. Writing of the ferocious reprisals taken against the Iron Guard, the author says, "I felt that perhaps this Oriental justice was the right course." Maybe, but genuine Oriental despots are wise enough not to alternate cruel revenge with appeasement.

It is a pity Mr. Patmore could not have stayed long enough in Bulgaria to revise his opinion "that most Bulgarians, despite their good qualities, are both envious and stupid." They are neither, of course, to any greater extent than any other people on the same cultural level. Nor are they cowards, as G. B. S. in his "Arms and the Man" made the world believe. Regrettable as it may be that Bulgaria through its resistance thwarted the Balkan Federation, we must not forget that after the murder of Stamboliski the Military League controlled both the country and its royal dictator, who eventually fled into the deadly embrace of the Nazis. The Bulgarian people are as little responsible for their predicament as the Hungarians or the Rumanians for theirs.

Whether the active resistance of the Yugoslav guerrillas and the passive resistance of the Greeks justify the author's optimistic view that "the Balkans are on the brink of revolt against the Nazi oppressors" is as hard to tell as how long the Turkish key to the Middle East will keep the gate locked. There can be, however, no reasonable dissent from Mr. Patmore's optimistic outlook for a Balkan confederation in the end, provided the intense nationalisms can "be destroyed once and for all." On this point the problem of the Balkans

merges with that of all Europe, but nationalism, like any other faith, persuasion, or religion, cannot be successfully destroyed unless some adequate substitute is offered. Internationalism seems still to be a poor *Ersatz* for the multitude.

RUSTEM VAMBERY

An Unknown Land

THAILAND: THE NEW SIAM. By Virginia Thompson. The Macmillan Company. \$5.

THAILAND'S declaration of war against the United States finds most Americans almost completely without information regarding the history and background of this new enemy. No complete history of the country has been written since its revolution, and little day-to-day information has been available except from government handouts and the censored press. Considering the difficulties involved in getting facts, Miss Thompson has done a remarkable and timely job. Her 800-page book covers every aspect of the country's history, present-day politics, economics, finance, culture, education, and international relationships. Practically all of this information is new to the average reader; and practically all of it has a bearing on the crucial political struggle which culminated in this ancient kingdom's entry into the world conflict on the side of the Axis.

So comprehensive is the picture that it is difficult to give even an impression of it in a short review. Generally speaking, it may be said that Thailand has been going through the same sort of national revolution as the other Oriental nations. As is frequently the case in small and weak states, this nationalism has taken some rather ugly forms. Its chief victims in this instance have been the Chinese—despite the fact that they had contributed very largely to Thailand's modernization in the years since World War I. Chinese business activities have been subjected to severe restrictions in recent years: thousands of Chinese were arrested and deported on framed-up charges; ten of Bangkok's eleven Chinese papers were suppressed. Other foreign business men, with the notable exception of the Japanese, have also been withdrawn from Thailand, though not under the same compulsion.

Japanese influence in Thailand, according to Miss Thompson, has been more recent and less complete than is ordinarily thought to be the case. Japanese trade with Siam was never large until 1933, when Siam's imports from Japan attained the high level of about 19 per cent of its total imports. This was the year in which Siam gained notoriety as the sole nation to abstain from censuring Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Although this action led the outside world to believe that Japan had a secret alliance with Siam, Miss Thompson casts doubt on this assumption. Most of the wild rumors of the period, including the persistent one that Japan had agreed to advance money to build a canal across the Malay Peninsula at Kra, proved to be groundless. Nevertheless, Siam was gradually drawn more and more into the Japanese orbit. But whatever the attitude of certain military factions, the Siamese people were never pro-Japanese. Even the award of parts of Indo-China to Thailand by Japan after their recent war seems to have done little to enhance Japa-



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nese popularity outside of military circles. Siam's participation in World War II, we assume, was accomplished largely by bribing the corrupt military clique, who in no sense represent the Siamese people.

MAXWELL S. STEWART

American Folkways

SHORT GRASS COUNTRY. By Stanley Vestal. Duell, Sloan, and Pearce. \$3.

OZARK COUNTRY. By Otto Ernest Rayburn. Duell, Sloan, and Pearce. \$3.

WHEN a writer sets out, as Mr. Vestal and Mr. Rayburn have done, to tell the story of one of the minor regions of the United States in terms of the customs of the people, he has given himself a large and difficult task. Mr. Vestal's book is the third and Mr. Rayburn's is the fourth of the American Folkways series, edited by Erskine Caldwell. Although both books have moments of considerable interest, they also offer evidence that the authors have taken their great task too lightly.

The United States is not easily divided into cultural sub-regions that will suit the convenience of writers and editors and publishers. Even some of our major regions are not easily

defined in terms of folkways. For example, the Anglo-Saxon mountaineers of the Southern highlands form a reasonably distinct folk group, but in the course of 150 years they have dislodged so many migrants from their stony acres that their folkways have spread through all the South and spilled over the Mississippi far to the West. The process continues apace in all cultural regions, large and small, and it is increasingly difficult to draw sharp boundaries between them.

Thus Mr. Vestal's effort to make a cultural region of the short-grass country is not very successful, not only because he does not work hard enough at it, but mainly because the short-grass country is scarcely a cultural region. Lying in the Texas and Oklahoma panhandles, with additional areas in Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico, the short-grass country could be described as a geographic, topographic, or even a floral region, but its culture is greatly mixed, and is shared with all the Western plains and mountains. There is scarcely one of Mr. Vestal's stories, unless it be about a dust storm, but could be told, and indeed has been told, of a score of other places in the Southwest, and especially in Texas.

Mr. Rayburn is somewhat more successful, both because he seems to have worked harder at his job, and because the Ozark plateau, occupying the southern half of Missouri, the northwestern part of Arkansas, and a few counties in eastern Oklahoma, is more genuinely a cultural region. Yet the life of the Ozarks is almost an exact reproduction of the life of the Southern highlands. The people have sprung from the same racial stocks and have preserved about the same customs. Moreover, these customs are not confined to the mountains. Mr. Rayburn describes a number of Ozark games. They are played with equal pleasure in the Mississippi delta and the Piney Woods of Alabama. This can be said also of Ozark food, Ozark religion, and Ozark superstition. The heritage of the mountaineers, for good and for ill, is spread far.

This is not to say that there can be no such thing as a good book about these rather shadowy sub-regions. But to make such a good book it is not enough to set down, in a casual way, the customs of the people, with a few anecdotes and tall stories for spice and garnish. That has been done too often already, and there is no longer much charm in it, and even less information. The inquiry now must be broader, and deeper; it must include economics, politics, religion, climate, the soil, everything that belongs to the regional life. What is necessary is that the author shall cultivate this regional soil intensely, and if the soil be thin, then all the more intensely must it be cultivated to grow a good book. There is still something to be said about the sub-regions, perhaps a great deal, but it will not do to scratch the surface with a crooked stick. The author must equip himself with modern tools and plow a deep furrow.

CHARLES CURTIS MUNZ

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Next Week in *The Nation*

Midwinter Book Issue

Articles and Reviews by Randall Jarrell, Odell Shepard, Franz Hoellering, Joseph Wood Krutch, Morton D. Zabel, Samuel Eliot Morison, Reinhold Niebuhr, George Barker, Jacques Barzun.

IN BRIEF

NORTHBRIDGE RECTORY. By Angela Thirkell. Knopf. \$2.50.

For those who prefer to take the war with a grain of salt and a dash of Angostura, Mrs. Thirkell dishes up another of her ambling, amiable caricatures of Britishers at work and play—this time showing the matrons of Northbridge on air-raid duty but with their minds undistracted from the really important things of life, like menus, marriage, and decorum. Mrs. Thirkell is a combination of Puck and Anthony Trollope.

BREAKFAST WITH THE NIKO-LIDES. By Rumer Godden. Little, Brown and Company. \$2.50.

This exotic novel, morbid and poetic, concerns a group of people in Bengal and the death of a dog—nothing more than that, but it probes certain raw nerve ends and psychological abscesses with such weird finesse as to make this event a turbulent crisis. Its lopsided, tormented characters and its narrative mannerisms are often exasperating, but the author's sensitiveness and good taste never let these peculiarities get entirely out of hand. In her explorations of the dark broodings and memories of neurotic folk she reminds one sharply of Carson McCullers.

SEVEN TEMPEST. By Vaughan Wilkins. The Macmillan Company. \$2.75.

Set in the robust early days of Victoria's reign, this semi-historical romance follows the fortunes of Anne Louise, niece of King Leopold of Belgium, and the seventh illegitimate son of a rapacious English financier. It is apparent that the author enjoyed writing it quite as much as a great many readers of light popular fiction will enjoy reading it. There is no pretense of fine writing, no fretting over any problems other than those of heart and hand; it is a bright and colorful picture of high adventure, by the writer of "And So—Victoria."

LATIN AMERICA. By William Lytle Schurz. E. P. Dutton. \$3.75.

To call this a one-volume encyclopedia of Latin America would give some idea of its comprehensiveness and authority but would hardly do justice to its informal readability. With map, glossary, index, and full bibliographical notes for those who wish to delve deeper, it is an ideal introduction for the student. It is also all the North American general reader needs to obtain a clear, unified

picture of the background of present inter-American relations, political, economic, and cultural.

PUBLISHED THIS WEEK

The Newspaper and Society. Edited by George L. Bird and Frederic E. Merwin. Prentice-Hall. \$5.35.

The Negro Caravan. Edited and Selected by Sterling A. Brown, Arthur P. Davis, and Ulysses Lee. Dryden Press. \$4.25.

The Kentucky. By Thomas D. Clark. Farrar and Rinehart. \$2.50.

Robert Bridges. By Albert Guérard, Jr. Harvard. \$3.50.

Farm for Fortune and Vice Versa. By Ladd Haystead. Putnam's. \$2.

They Taught Themselves. By Sidney Janis. Dial. \$3.50.

Westward the Course! By Paul McGuire. Morrow. \$3.75.

The Pragmatic Test. By Henry Bamford Parkes. Colt Press. \$3.

The Mind of the Maker. By Dorothy L. Sayers. Harcourt, Brace. \$2.

Music and the Line of Most Resistance. By Artur Schnabel. Princeton. \$1.50.

The Economics of Total War. By Henry William Spiegel. Appleton-Century. \$3.

The Destiny of Western Man. By W. T. Stace. Reynal and Hitchcock. \$3.

Color, Class, and Personality. By Robert L. Sutherland. American Council on Education. \$1.25.

Modern Battle. By Major Paul W. Thompson. Norton. \$2.75.

Print, Radio, and Film in a Democracy. Edited by Douglas Waples. Chicago. \$2.

The Language of Poetry. By Philip Wheelwright, Cleanth Brooks, I. A. Richards, and Wallace Stevens. Edited by Allen Tate. Princeton. \$2.

DRAMA

Mice in Modern Literature

I CAN'T be accused of prejudice, for I'm an animal lover myself. What's more, I have an especially high opinion of the mouse and his relatives. He's a "wee slikit timorous cowering beastie," and he's cute. But I do think that the rodent is being rather overdone as a symbol of something. Perhaps Micky doesn't really count, since there isn't much aboriginal mouse left in him. But there was Mr. Steinbeck's Lennie, who liked them very dead; Mr. Saroyan's recent heroine, who constituted herself protectress of the whole tribe; and now comes the philosopher-tramp of "Solitaire" (Plymouth Theater), who keeps a Brother Rat in a home-made cage, and is therefore to be recognized immediately as a good man. I don't want to accuse Mr. Corle of imitating, but it

does look as though he had taken "bigger and better rodents" as his motto.

Right at the beginning I should say that this new play, dramatized by John Van Druten from a novel by Edwin Corle, has the advantage of an extremely painstaking production and at least two extraordinarily well-acted roles—one by Victor Kilian as the philosophical vagabond and the other by Pat Hitchcock, the little daughter of the well-known movie director. Production and acting alike do all that could possibly be done to take the curse off the sentimental story and the frequently gooey writing. But you can't fool me. "Solitaire" is still a play about a poor little rich girl discussing the nature of ultimate reality with a philosophical tramp who talks as if he were not only thoroughly familiar with Bishop Berkeley but had probably read Bradley and other modern defenders of Absolute Idealism as well. Mr. Saroyan can get away with this sort of thing—at least he can get away with it so far as I am concerned—by keeping everything carefully on the level of unreality. But when a playwright doesn't himself seem to know on what level he is operating, when he drifts back and forth between some sort of hard-boiled realism and pure fantasy, then what you

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get is that special kind of sentimentality of which the essence is a failure to distinguish between fact and fancy, between what you literally believe and what you find it irresponsibly pleasant to imagine. I am very fond of Alice and her Wonderland, but that does not mean that I can put up with either Little Nell or Little Eva. And it is with the two last that Mr. Van Druten's "Little Virginia" unmistakably belongs.

Ostensibly "Solitaire" is a socio-humanitarian document about a group of unemployed migrants living temporarily hidden at the bottom of an arroyo (Californian for gully) near an upper-class residential district. A little girl has discovered them, and from one she gets a kind of understanding she had never had at home. But when her parents learn where she has been they can think only of driving the riffraff out, and they summon the police, who do a thorough job, even to setting the squatter camp ablaze and quite possibly burning the rat alive in his little wire box.

Now I am, I hope, capable of sympathy for men as well as for mice, but I have my doubts about sentimentalism even as a humanitarian force. There is something suspiciously Victorian about a renewed tendency I have been observing to discover all sorts of rather unlikely virtues among the dispossessed, and I am far from sure that the tendency bodes well for either humanitarianism or literature. I thought that we had wisely got over talking about the "worthy poor" and had come to the realistic conclusion that one of the worst things about destitution is just the fact that it does not have a tendency to develop in its victims the gentler virtues. I wonder about the soundness of the theory that we should hesitate to exterminate the Okies chiefly because some of them are philosophers and kind to animals besides. I remember Bernard Shaw's declaration that the trouble with the poor is poverty, his implication that we should do something about them not because they are such nice people but because, being very poor, they probably are not. I also remember William James's famous story about the Russian aristocrat who allowed her coachman to freeze to death on his box while she was inside a theater weeping over the sufferings of the poor. The coachman, you see, wasn't "worthy," like the poor in the play. And I wonder just what the reaction of a spectator at "Solitaire" will be when he rushes out to help the destitute only to discover not a single ideal companion for his daughter in the whole bunch.

At the Longacre Theater a Greek star named Katina Paxinou is appearing in a revival of "Hedda Gabler." According to the program Miss Paxinou has been very famous in Athens, and one may guess that she is probably an actress of considerable ability, but she struggles with an accent which seems to me particularly unfortunate in this particular role, despite the fact that Nazimova used to play it while laboring under the same handicap. Hedda is a strange and dangerous woman who, nevertheless, has managed up to the time of the play to be accepted as a member of the society in which she lives. But the play is thrown completely out of balance and the whole initial situation becomes completely incredible when Hedda is an obvious foreigner, totally unlike the people around her in appearance, in accent, and in gesture. It then becomes impossible to think of her except as a creature so obviously exotic that Tesman could not possibly have married her and Tesman's friends and relatives could not possibly have attempted to treat her as one of themselves.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

MUSIC

AARON COPLAND'S writing is fluent but not orderly or precise—which makes it difficult to deal with. As I understand the open paragraph of his book "Our New Music" (Whittlesey House; \$2.50), he thinks that the lay listener has been antagonistic or apathetic to recent music because its new styles and tendencies have bewildered him, and that they have bewildered him because he has not known how and why and out of what they have developed. Mr. Copland, then, undertakes to inform this listener of the "change in expressive ideal" and the extension of vocabulary that produced modern music; and he does this to remove from the listener's mind the "fantastic notions . . . concerning the nature of so-called 'modern music'" which "incredible as it may seem . . . are still being circulated by newspaper writers and radio commentators who ought to know better"—to remove, that is, the notions that the music lacks emotion and melody, is rhythmically over-complicated and harmonically cacophonous—and to enable the listener to recognize the emotion that is merely changed in quality and intensity, the melody, rhythm, and harmony that are merely enriched. And as I understand him, Mr. Copland be-

lieves that when the listener recognizes in modern music "the expression in terms of an enriched musical language of a new spirit of objectivity, attuned to our own times . . . the music of the composer of today—in other words—*our* music," he will find this music as significant, interesting, and valuable as listeners fifty and a hundred years ago found *their* music.

Lay readers of Mr. Copland's book who have actually heard Schönberg, Bartók, von Webern, and the other modern extremists may be amused by his reference to "an enriched musical language," and his wide-eyed, incredible-as-it-may-seem, how-can-such-things-be talk about the "fantastic notions" with which newspaper writers, apparently for the sheer hell of it, have misrepresented the music; or they may be irritated by all this; but they won't be fooled by it. For they will know that those newspaper writers have described what is plain to hear in the music. Even these readers may, however, accept Mr. Copland's contention that when they understand the aesthetic and procedures of the music they will be able to hear in it the value they have not heard. And if my experience means anything that contention is wrong. At the same time as I began to listen to the music, after the last war, with mind and ears that were open, receptive, eager, I began to read discussions and explanations of it, in the hope that with them I would perceive the new artistic beauty or potency in what impressed me as hideous or feeble; but nothing I have learned from reading about Schönberg, Bartók, and the rest in the past twenty years has changed the impression I have got from listening to them.

Nor is it different with Mr. Copland's book. A reader who learns from it that there *is* emotion in Schönberg's music may find that he doesn't like the emotion or the music it is communicated in. He may learn that the emotion and the vocabulary it utilizes make the music "ours," and discover that what is "ours" is impressive and valuable to him when it is Stravinsky's "Petrouchka" or Bloch's Quintet or Prokofiev's Violin Concerto No. 1—to say nothing of Picasso's Guernica studies and post-scripts—but not when it is Schönberg's "Pierrot Lunaire."

Mr. Copland's treatment of the American part of his subject is also open to objection; but this requires more time and space than I have left now.

B. H. HAGGIN

Letters to the Editors

Thomas's Inconsistency

Dear Sirs: Norman Thomas's letter explaining his stand on Russia, in your issue of January 31, throws a good deal of light on the reasons for the intellectual decline of the Socialist Party under his leadership. For he either has repudiated the plain implications of his position or would repudiate them.

Thomas denounced the Soviet government for making the non-aggression pact with Hitler and thereby agreeing to remain neutral in the war, which by then was obviously just around the corner. The only logical basis for such denunciation was that Soviet Russia, in making the pact, deserted the somewhat inchoate collective-security front of the anti-Nazi nations against the Axis and thus helped to encourage aggression by making it easier for the Nazis to seize their victims one by one. But Mr. Thomas steadily insisted that the neutral position in the war which he denounced Stalin for taking should be maintained by the United States. He accordingly opposed modification of the Neutrality Act, the destroyers-for-bases deal, the Lend-Lease Act, and every other step which the Roosevelt Administration took to keep the anti-Nazi forces from being overwhelmed.

At the Socialist Party's national convention in 1940, for example, he opposed, and by his influence got the majority of the convention to oppose, resolutions favoring aid to the anti-Axis countries and also one demanding an embargo on goods to Japan. Thus Thomas and the Socialist Party under his influence opposed aid to Britain in fighting the Axis and opposed stopping the aid we were giving to Japan in its war with China, and took this position after having denounced Stalin for giving aid to Hitler through the Soviet-Nazi pact.

Of course real security against war for any nation can only be obtained through genuine international collective security. Thomas clearly perceived that when he was considering Soviet Russia's foreign policy but could not admit it in connection with our own foreign policy, although as a Socialist he was supposed to have an international viewpoint.

Thomas states that his present position on Russia and the war is that he "does not want the war to continue

indefinitely till Stalin is lord over most of Europe." If this means anything at all, it means that he wants the war to stop before the Nazis are defeated and overthrown so that Germany, still powerfully armed and in possession of some of its conquests, can be used as a counterweight against Soviet Russia.

This of course is merely another example of the old balance-of-power policy which has been pursued for generations by the British Conservatives. That is the logical implication of Thomas's position, though he would bitterly denounce the British for pursuing such a policy in the past (in fact, it was exactly Chamberlain's policy), and he would probably denounce balance-of-power politics in any other form. Yet the policy of collective security against aggression, the only possible alternative, except the imperialist rule of one country, to balance-of-power politics, Thomas has likewise opposed in every one of the actual issues in which the principle of collective security has been presented to the American government and public opinion.

ALFRED BAKER LEWIS

New York, February 6

The Truth Will Arm Us

Dear Sirs: Such articles as Mr. Mitchell's How to Lose the War in *The Nation* of January 24 go to the heart of the grim, harsh realities of the war since December 7. If only those articles got as much attention as a Hearst-headline, or a *Saturday Evening Post* article such as Demaree Bess's specious The Axis Is a Myth, or a New York Times cartoon, we might hope for a quick, active awakening all over America.

Too many American cartoonists fall back on the easy device of mere ridicule of the Japs. Sinister, ruthless, and menacing aggressors cannot thus be "cartooned" into weakness or impotence. In a recent Sunday New York Times were two cases in point: (1) a grinning Jap diplomat figure-skating "victories" on ice, after which he is seen plunging blindly into the black open water of "Allied plans"; (2) a moronic Jap shooting at a bull's-eye, the Dutch East Indies, but only managing to pepper Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore—the cartoon captioned "A miss is as good as a mile."

Such cocky-confident interpretations of the Japanese threat do not condition Americans for eventualities or steel their wills to grim, all-out efforts. Rather, these cartoons tend to lull us into a dangerous complacency comparable to the French before May, 1940, or the British before Dunkirk, or some commanders at Pearl Harbor before December 7.

Let our cartoonists ponder Owen Johnson's great letter which also appeared in the *Times*: "It is the responsibility of the great free press of America to tell the people the truth. . . . Tell them again and again and again that the stake is our own survival. Prepare them now for the disasters that may come. Stiffen their backs, toughen them, steel their courage to fight it out. . . . Believe me, the truth will double their strength and awaken the moral grandeur of a free people."

Nothing less than the forthright dramatizing of challenging realities—no wishful anticipations—can hope to arouse and sustain our national morale.

CARLTON F. WELLS

Ann Arbor, Mich., January 30

Aliens—Friends and Enemies

Dear Sirs: A re-registration of all "enemy aliens" in the United States and its possessions has been ordered by the President for the month of February. Would this not present a splendid opportunity to demonstrate the sense of justice which is the very spirit of democracy by dividing the so-called "enemy aliens" into different categories, as was done in England shortly after the outbreak of the war? A genuine refugee from Nazi oppression in England today is officially considered a "friendly alien" if he has been able to prove his identity. It should be even easier for him to prove this in the United States, where refugees have been admitted as immigrants, for American consulates abroad have been required to examine each would-be immigrant most carefully. In addition, American citizens have had to submit full guaranties as to the political and moral integrity of the future American citizen.

At the present time thousands of racial and political refugees from Axis countries have taken the necessary steps to become American citizens, and many

of them have lost their former Axis citizenship by expatriation. A great number of these "enemy aliens" were hunted all over Europe by the agents of the Gestapo before they were finally able to enter the United States—often with the assistance of the very American government which now classifies them as enemies.

The sense of bitterness and disillusion in the minds of these people, who, before they became "enemy aliens," were proud to call themselves loyal immigrants and future citizens of the greatest democracy in the world, is by no means helpful in building morale among the foreign-born in America.

IRENE POPPER

New York, January 30

Rose Stein

Dear Sirs: Just as I was about to start a letter to Rose Stein I received a cutting from *The Nation* of November 27 announcing her death. I hope it is not too late for an Englishman to pay a tribute to her memory.

We met but seldom—first during a two weeks' stay I spent in Pittsburgh in 1934 and later for one day in Washington in 1937, but she admitted me, I am

proud to say, to her friendship from the first, and her letters for the last half-dozen years, with their acute and realistic analysis of the American labor situation, were a perpetual delight and stimulus.

Latterly, as was perhaps inevitable, we tended to discuss rather the international position of the United States and, as no doubt was equally inevitable, did not always see eye to eye. Rose Stein had a deep aversion from war with all that it would mean for the workers of her country, while I was more inclined to urge that effort short of war was not enough to vindicate America's position as a champion of democracy. But while I fear that from time to time my arguments caused her distress, her friendship and interest never flagged.

With her passing there leaves us a valued interpreter of the American scene, a valiant champion of American labor, and a staunch friend.

E. M. HUGH-JONES

Oxford, England, January 9

Scandalous Coddling

Dear Sirs: I am a gentleman of the old school, and I beg leave to protest against the way Congress is preparing to coddle the millions of automobile workers who will be out of jobs for a few months while factories are being retooled for war production. It appears that these unemployed workers are to be paid enough to live on while they train for new jobs in war work.

That is all wrong. That is not the way to treat the unemployed. First, we should tell them that there is a job somewhere for every worker who really wants one. We should insist upon their tramping the streets looking for work until their shoes are worn out, their savings entirely spent, and their children crying for food. Then we should let them apply for relief as paupers.

Only then, if at all, should we give them work-relief jobs at ditch-digging and road-mending. But we should make it clear to them that the work they are doing is utterly useless and that they are only a bunch of bums and shovel-leaners. And finally we should decide that their so-called work is a luxury that the nation cannot afford and drastically reduce our appropriation for it, so as to throw at least half of them back on the dole.

That is what we did in the past. Are we going to start in now treating the unemployed as though they were useful and important—actually as though we

could not win this great war without their help?

It is true that these automobile workers were fine, upstanding, hard-working citizens when they were still employed manufacturing Fords, Chevrolets, Cadillacs, Oldsmobiles, etc. But the minute the factory closed down they joined the ranks of the unemployed, which means that they promptly became incompetent, shiftless chiselers. "They wouldn't work if you offered them a job." Anyone who has been reading the newspaper editorials of the past few years knows how to deal with the unemployed.

PRO BONO PUBLICO

New York, February 4

CONTRIBUTORS

HOWARD COSTIGAN, news analyst and radio commentator for Station KOL, initiated the campaign to block scrap shipments to Japan from Seattle.

DWIGHT MACDONALD was formerly on the editorial staff of *Fortune* and is now an editor of the *Partisan Review*.

JOACHIM JOESTEN, for six years a correspondent in the Scandinavian countries, is now editor of *Background*, a weekly news letter on foreign affairs published in New York.

W. R. RODGERS, a young poet of County Armagh, Ireland, will soon bring out in this country a book entitled "Awake! and Other Wartime Poems."

OSCAR WILLIAMS is the author of a book of poetry entitled "The Man Coming Toward You."

E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, head of the Department of Sociology at Howard University, is the author of "The Negro Family in the United States."

RUTH NORDEN, together with Heinz Norden, has edited and translated a number of German books for publication in this country.

CATHERINE PORTER, editor of the *Far Eastern Survey*, published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, will soon bring out a volume called "Crisis in the Philippines."

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KENNETH LESLIE

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